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ABSTRACT 
  This Article offers a process-based method to assess Internet 
censorship that is compatible with different value sets about what 
content should be blocked. Whereas China’s Internet censorship 
receives considerable attention, censorship in the United States and 
other democratic countries is largely ignored. The Internet is 
increasingly fragmented by nations’ different value judgments about 
what content is unacceptable. Countries differ not in their intent to 
censor material—from political dissent in Iran to copyrighted songs in 
America—but in the content they target, how precisely they block it, 
and how involved their citizens are in these choices. Previous scholars 
have analyzed Internet censorship from values-based perspectives, 
sporadically addressing key principles such as openness, 
transparency, narrowness, and accountability. This Article is the first 
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to unite these principles into a coherent methodology. Drawing upon 
scholarship in deliberative democracy, health policy, labor standards, 
and cyberlaw, this Article applies this new framework to contentious 
debates about sales of censorship technology by Western companies, 
public law regulation of these transactions, and third-party analysis of 
Internet censorship. 
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It’s taken governments a long time to realize that you don’t need to 
manipulate unwelcome news. Just don’t show it. 
– P.D. James, THE CHILDREN OF MEN1 
INTRODUCTION 
How can legal scholars make normative distinctions among 
Saudi Arabia’s decision to censor Internet pornography, China’s 
efforts to suppress political dissent online, and America’s moves to 
filter illegal MP3 files from the Web? Is it acceptable for Cisco to sell 
networking gear to China, knowing that it will be used to block 
dissident views,2 or for Verizon to drop Usenet newsgroups at the 
New York State Attorney General’s behest?3 Whereas China’s 
Internet censorship receives considerable attention, censorship in the 
United States and other democratic countries is largely ignored. The 
Internet’s increasing fragmentation, driven by technological 
censorship, derives from different value judgments made by countries 
about the relative importance of free expression, protection of 
minority interests, concern for societal cohesion, and other goals. The 
common thread, though, is censorship: most countries use cybersieves 
to try to filter undesirable content and make it disappear from the 
Web. Whether it is copyrighted songs in America or political dissent 
in Iran, the goal is the same; only the targeted material varies. 
Countries differ not in their intent to limit access to material online, 
but in the content they ban, the precision of their blocking, and the 
voice they offer citizens in decisionmaking. This Article offers a new, 
process-based method to measure the legitimacy4 of these efforts, 
 
 1. P.D. James, THE CHILDREN OF MEN 123 (1992). 
 2. See Sarah Lai Stirland, Cisco Leak: “Great Firewall” of China Was a Chance to Sell 
More Routers, WIRED, May 20, 2008, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/05/leaked-cisco-
do.html. 
 3. See Danny Hakim, 3 Net Providers Will Block Sites with Child Sex, N.Y. TIMES, June 
10, 2008, at A1; see also Declan McCullagh, N.Y. Attorney General Forces ISPs to Curb Usenet 
Access, CNET NEWS, June 10, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9964895-38.html 
(quoting statements from Time Warner Cable and Verizon that they would block Usenet 
groups but not Web sites). 
 4. While there are multiple normative positions on legitimacy, this Article argues for a 
process-based approach that embodies an increasingly universal set of governance norms, as 
embodied in documents such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Authoritarian 
countries tend to adhere outwardly to the forms of process-based governance, even if their 
actions contravene its substance. I argue that process-based legitimacy maps sufficiently well 
onto widely shared norms that it should enjoy analytical primacy, and that it is likely to be the 
most helpful tool for multiple actors with different values-based agendas. 
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advancing debate about the balance between information sharing and 
control on the Internet, and about how that balance is struck.5 Its 
analytical framework is compatible with divergent views on what 
material should be banned, strengthening norms-based assessments. 
Scholars who have addressed Internet filtering have approached 
the issue from multiple values-based perspectives. But this Article is 
the first to recognize that values-based analysis is unhelpful in a world 
of pervasive Internet censorship and to offer an integrated 
methodology for evaluating how decisions about online information 
controls are made. This new framework examines critically the 
processes of Internet censorship to evaluate how well a country 
describes what it censors and why, whether it effectively blocks 
proscribed material while leaving permitted content untouched, and 
how much its citizens can participate in filtering decisions. Because 
online censorship is sharply on the rise worldwide—in democratic 
states6 as well as in authoritarian ones7—corporations, citizens, and 
governments will increasingly be forced to make difficult judgments 
about filtering practices.8 
Part I examines current approaches to Internet censorship and 
details their shortcomings; it then introduces a process-based solution 
(which this Article refers to as the “Framework”) and explores its 
roots in contemporary legal thinking. Part II describes the 
Framework’s four components, with examples from countries that 
censor the Internet. Part III advocates development of competing 
quantitative metrics to measure these components, and then explains 
how the metrics can help resolve three contentious policy debates. 
First, how should companies decide when to sell technology enabling 
 
 5. See generally John G. Palfrey, Jr. & Robert Rogoyski, The Move to the Middle: The 
Enduring Threat of “Harmful” Speech to the End-to-End Principle, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 
31 (2006) (describing recent changes in Internet regulation practices). 
 6. See, e.g., Danny O’Brien, Turkish Censor Lacks Others’ Subtle Touch, IRISH TIMES, 
Mar. 23, 2007, at 7 (noting that Great Britain and the European Union have expressed interest 
in blocking access to terrorism materials). 
 7. Kevin Voigt, Internet Censorship Gathers Steam, CNN.COM, Apr. 24, 2007, http:// 
edition.cnn.com/2007/BUSINESS/04/18/online.censorship/index.html; see also Matthew Quirk, 
The Web Police, ATL. MONTHLY, May 2006, at 50, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
doc/print/200605/chinese-internet (detailing widespread censorship in China, Iran, and other 
authoritarian nations). 
 8. See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, Access Denied, 452 NATURE 155, 155 (2008); Christopher S. 
Rugaber, Google Fights Global Internet Censorship, WASH. POST, June 25, 2007, http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/25/AR2007062500364_pf.html. 
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a country’s censorship?9 Second, how should governments decide 
whether to regulate these transactions using public law? Finally, how 
can other nations, activists, and scholars evaluate countries’ online 
information restrictions, such as when naming countries as human 
rights violators?10 Part IV assesses the Framework’s challenges and 
limitations, and the Article concludes with observations about the rise 
of filtering worldwide. 
I.  THE INTERNETS 
A. Series of Filtered Tubes 
Current analytical approaches to Internet censorship are 
inadequate to assess filtering that is increasingly ubiquitous. This 
Section describes the problem of multiple Internets, explains why 
extant theories are unworkable, and explains how the divergence of 
norms around what content is and is not permissible challenges 
filtering analysis. 
There is no longer one Internet.11 Technological censorship by 
countries worldwide means that how the Net appears depends upon 
where you access it.12 In Beijing, one cannot reach sites criticizing the 
Chinese Communist Party.13 In Mumbai, Internet Service Providers 
 
 9. See generally Jonathan Zittrain & John Palfrey, Reluctant Gatekeepers: Corporate 
Ethics on a Filtered Internet, in ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL 
INTERNET FILTERING 103 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008) (arguing that corporations 
themselves are best positioned to take the lead in establishing a code of conduct); Press Release, 
Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., Companies, Human Rights Groups, Investors, Academics and 
Technology Leaders to Address International Free Expression and Privacy Challenges (Jan. 18, 
2007), http://www.cdt.org/press/20070118press-humanrights.php (announcing a meeting of 
various stakeholders “to seek solutions to the free expression and privacy challenges faced by 
technology and communications companies doing business internationally”). 
 10. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, 2007 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES (2008), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/ (describing individual 
countries’ human rights advances and setbacks within a democratic government framework). 
 11. See Jonathan Zittrain & John Palfrey, Introduction, in ACCESS DENIED, supra note 9, 
at 1, 2–4. 
 12. See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? (2006) 
(describing the success of governments in controlling Internet access and content). 
 13. See OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN CHINA 17 (2009), 
http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_China_2009.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES—2007: CHINA (2008), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100518.htm (describing China’s human rights practices 
generally, including Internet censorship); James Fallows, “The Connection Has Been Reset,” 
ATL. MONTHLY, Mar. 2008, at 64, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200803/chinese-
firewall. 
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(ISPs) block the religious extremist Web site Hindu Unity.14 A user 
searching Google for “stormfront” in Paris will see the game 
designers’ site, but not that of the white supremacist group.15 From 
Boston, someone looking for copyrighted music files may find them 
removed from search engines or host sites.16 The decision to hold the 
2008 Summer Olympic Games in the People’s Republic of China 
focused attention—and criticism—on China’s online restrictions,17 but 
other countries18 such as Iran,19 Indonesia,20 Japan,21 Australia,22 New 
Zealand,23 and Brazil24 also censor cyberspace. Increasingly, countries 
 
 14. OPENNET INITIATIVE, INDIA 4 (2007), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/india. 
pdf; see also Nart Villeneuve, Evasion Tactics, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Nov. 2007, at 71, 76. 
 15. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Google Excluding Controversial Sites, CNET NEWS, Oct. 
23, 2002, http://www.news.com/2100-1023-963132.html. See generally OPENNET INITIATIVE, 
EUROPE (2007), http://opennet.net/research/regions/Europe (describing filtering practices by 
category in European countries). 
 16. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? 
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 622 (2006). See generally Google, Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, http://www.google.com/dmca.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009) 
(describing policies for removing infringing sites or material). 
 17. See, e.g., Edward Cody, IOC Allows China to Limit Reporters’ Access to Internet, 
WASH. POST, July 31, 2008, at A10 (describing Olympic journalists finding certain Web content 
blocked); I.O.C. Member Accuses Committee of Betrayal on Censorship Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
1, 2008, at D7 (same); Andrew Jacobs, Beijing Games Denying Media Full Use of Web, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 31, 2008, at A1 (same). 
 18. See generally Anick Jesdanun, Is It Censorship or Protection?, WASH. POST, July 20, 
2008, at A3 (describing censorship practices of various ISPs and Web sites). 
 19. Iran Launches Fresh Crackdown on Websites: Report, AFP, May 20, 2008, http://afp. 
google.com/article/ALeqM5jgPmlgFydl8ifBE-OLsLXcyQYUgg. But see JOHN KELLY & 
BRUCE ETLING, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, HARVARD UNIV. PUB. NO. 2008-01, 
MAPPING IRAN’S ONLINE PUBLIC: POLITICS AND CULTURE IN THE PERSIAN BLOGOSPHERE 21 
(2008), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/Kelly&Etling_ 
Mapping_Irans_Online_Public_2008.pdf (noting researchers’ “surprise that such a large 
proportion of that part of the blogosphere, which the regime must consider oppositional, is in 
fact visible within Iran”). 
 20. Indonesia Seeks to Block YouTube over Anti-Koran Film, REUTERS, Apr. 2, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSSP23588120080402. 
 21. See, e.g., J. Mark Lytle, Internet Censorship Body Swings into Action, TECHRADAR 
UK, July 4, 2008, http://www.techradar.com/news/internet/web/internet-censorship-body-
swings-into-action-415849 (describing filtering of sites accessible to minors via mobile phones). 
 22. Derek E. Bambauer, Filtering in Oz: Australia’s Foray into Internet Censorship, 31 U. 
PA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1319466. 
 23. Jacqui Cheng, New Zealand Moves Forward with Child Porn Filtering System, ARS 
TECHNICA, July 17, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/new-zealand-moves-
forward-with-child-porn-filtering-system.ars. 
 24. Google in Deal with Brazil to Fight Child Porn, REUTERS, July 2, 2008, http://www. 
reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUSN0237672120080702. 
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use computer technology to block access to prohibited content—a 
practice known as Internet “filtering.”25 Their objective is to shape 
citizens’ information environments and thereby alter behavior.26 A 
persistent challenge for Internet law scholars has been to define a set 
of criteria to evaluate the legitimacy of such restrictions.27 These 
efforts, however, are unsatisfactory in addressing filtering that is ever 
more common and more technologically sophisticated. Pioneers such 
as John Perry Barlow28 and John Gilmore29 advocate 
cyberlibertarianism, arguing that nothing should be blocked, and that 
perhaps nothing can be blocked. Amitai Etzioni has written that 
implementing localized standards is technically possible and 
desirable, particularly to protect minors.30 Cheryl Preston has sought 
filtering of “harmful” content based on American norms.31 David 
Johnson and David Post look to Internet-specific forms of democratic 
organization to resolve the question.32 Thomas Schultz supports 
filtering to protect a country’s core values, based on social contract 
theory and a Hegelian state that embodies collective will.33 Kevin 
Werbach opposes filtering because of censorship’s threat “to the 
structure and universality of the Internet.”34 
 
 25. See generally Zittrain & Palfrey, supra note 11, at 2 (defining “filtering”). 
 26. Filtering is information regulation via code—computer hardware and software—rather 
than law, though its technical measures are frequently backed by legal mandates. See 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 24, 121–32 (2006) (describing modes of regulation). 
 27. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Women in the Web of Secondary Copyright Liability and Internet 
Filtering, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 449, 481–87 (2005) (noting that filtering criteria reflect broader 
patterns of gender and social power). 
 28. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (1996), available 
at http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html. But see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Does 
Power Grow Out of the Barrel of a Modem? Some Thoughts on Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu’s 
Who Controls the Internet?, 18 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 432, 433 (2007) (“Barlow’s vision of a 
separate and untouchable cybersphere is increasingly unrealistic.”). 
 29. Gilmore famously stated that “[t]he Net interprets censorship as damage and routes 
around it.” Philip Elmer-Dewitt, First Nation in Cyberspace, TIME, Dec. 6, 1993, at 62. 
 30. See Amitai Etzioni, On Protecting Children from Speech, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 50–
52 (2004). 
 31. See Cheryl B. Preston, Making Family-Friendly Internet a Reality: The Internet 
Community Ports Act, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1471, 1483–85. 
 32. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1391–1402 (1996). 
 33. Thomas Schultz, Carving Up the Internet: Jurisdiction, Legal Orders and the 
Private/Public International Law Interface, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 799, 806 (2008). 
 34. Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself Together, and 
the Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 367 (2008). 
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These approaches have significant shortcomings. Some 
approaches treat restrictions as binary—either all-pervasive 
censorship or an unlimited marketplace of ideas. Other approaches 
canonize one normative view of content as ideal: banning hate speech 
is bad, but blocking pornography is desirable. And some approaches 
defer to local standards without offering methods to assess them. 
Searching for a robust evaluative methodology has particular salience 
given the surge in efforts to filter the Internet in the United States35—
for example, suggestions that ISPs should filter copyrighted material,36 
pornography should be segregated onto a separate “channel,”37 or 
ISPs should limit subscribers’ access to Web sites38 or Usenet news 
groups (on topics from SCUBA diving39 to radio astronomy40) to 
reduce distribution of child pornography.41 Current theoretical 
approaches to Internet filtering falter when confronted with 
censorship by democratic countries. 
Moreover, although these countries increasingly agree that 
Internet users should be prevented from accessing certain content, 
their norms regarding banned content vary widely. There is scant 
agreement on what material ought to be off-limits—that is, material 
whose viewing should be blocked proactively rather than punished 
after the fact.42 This divergence makes it hard to assess filtering’s 
legitimacy other than by whether the country blocks material one 
finds objectionable and leaves other content accessible.43 Importing 
 
 35. The FCC, though, has punished ISPs that unilaterally filter, voting to require Comcast 
not to block customers’ file-sharing traffic. E.g., John Dunbar, FCC Rules Against Comcast, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2008, at D2. 
 36. See Tim Wu, Has AT&T Lost Its Mind?, SLATE, Jan. 16, 2008, http://www.slate.com/ 
id/2182152/. 
 37. Cheryl B. Preston, Zoning the Internet: A New Approach to Protecting Children Online, 
2007 BYU L. REV. 1417, 1426. 
 38. See Jasa Santos, Qwest Blocks Access to Known Child Porn Sites, CASPER STAR-
TRIBUNE, July 7, 2008, available at http://www.trib.com/articles/2008/07/08/news/wyoming/8d7 
cbb0a6413fa718725747e007d4326.txt. 
 39. E.g., Rec.scuba, http://groups.google.com/group/rec.scuba/topics. 
 40. E.g., IAC Indian Astronomy Club, http://groups.google.com/group/indianastronomy 
club. 
 41. McCullagh, supra note 3. 
 42. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Beth S. Noveck & Kermit Roosevelt, Filtering the Internet—A Best 
Practices Model, in PROTECTING OUR CHILDREN ON THE INTERNET: TOWARDS A NEW 
CULTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY 199, 210 (Jens Waltermann & Marcel Machill eds., 2000) (noting 
the “wide cultural and ideological diversity” that filtering must reflect). 
 43. See generally Gordon Hull, Overblocking Autonomy: The Case of Mandatory Library 
Filtering Software, 42 CONTINENTAL PHIL. REV. 81 (2009), available at http://www.springerlink. 
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U.S. standards for content is unhelpful—the limited restrictions on 
expression permitted by America’s Constitution are atypically 
narrow.44 Many Americans would object to the United Arab 
Emirates’ (UAE) decision to block all sites hosted in Israel’s top-level 
domain;45 UAE citizens might object to the United States’ willingness 
to tolerate sites offering pornography or endorsing alcohol 
consumption.46 Britain47 and Canada48 filter child pornography, and 
Australia is testing this approach,49 yet in Japan, possession of child 
pornography is lawful.50 British defamation law prohibits more speech 
than its American counterpart doctrine, despite their shared historical 
roots.51 Anti-Semitic speech is permitted in Skokie but banned in 
Toronto.52 Even U.S. standards vary by subject matter. American 
government officials criticize search engines when they help censor 
 
com/content/71742w01k1432463/fulltext.pdf (describing library filtering of pornography as the 
construction of a space purged of “deviant” sexuality). 
 44. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Unlike Others, U.S. Defends Freedom to Offend in Speech, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 12, 2008, at A1; Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment 23 (John F. 
Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t Faculty Research Working Paper Group, Paper No. 05-021, 2005), 
available at http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=167. 
 45. OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 6 
(2009), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_UAE_2009.pdf. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Martin Bright, BT Puts Block on Child Porn Sites, OBSERVER, June 6, 2004, at 7. 
 48. See Cybertip.ca, Cleanfeed Canada, http://cybertip.ca/app/en/cleanfeed (follow “Does 
the system filter legitimate, non-child pornography sites? (show)” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 
23, 2009) (stating that Canada’s Cleanfeed system blocks “access to Internet addresses 
specifically containing child pornography images”). 
 49. Bambauer, supra note 22, at 10. 
 50. Jake Adelstein, This Mob Is Big in Japan, WASH. POST, May 11, 2008, at B2 (noting 
that producing or distributing child pornography, while illegal, is rarely investigated). 
 51. See, e.g., Harrods Ltd. v. Dow Jones & Co., [2003] EWHC (QB) 1162, [38]–[39] (Eng.); 
Demon v. Godfrey Internet Ltd., [2001] Q.B. 201, 204 (Eng.) (explaining that under English 
law, unlike in the United States, a defendant publisher has the burden of proving innocence). 
Protections for reporting on issues of public interest, however, have expanded recently. 
Jameel v. Wall St. J. Europe SPRL, [2006] UKHL 44 (U.K.); Reynolds v. Times Newspapers 
Ltd., [2001] 2 AC 127, 176–77 (Eng.). 
 52. Compare Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43 (1978) (per 
curiam) (overturning an injunction prohibiting public display of “hatred against persons of 
Jewish faith or ancestry”), with Can. (Human Rights Comm’n) v. Taylor, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892, 
941 (Can.) (upholding a cease and desist order prohibiting telephone calls containing 
“statements denigrating the Jewish race or religion”). 
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political speech in China53 and when they fail to censor copyrighted 
materials there.54 
Even in democratic countries, the types of content restricted and 
the standards for doing so diverge. Comparing nations’ online 
censorship from one normative perspective is unhelpful. Countries 
with similar views on banning information fare well, and countries 
with contrary attitudes fare poorly. Evaluators tend to approve of 
like-minded thinkers. Restricting Internet information is a policy 
question about choosing among multiple regulatory endpoints that 
are both possible and legitimate.55 This dilemma—choosing among 
divergent substantive values—parallels classic problems in American 
constitutional law. Scholars such as Alexander Bickel, John Hart Ely, 
and Jeremy Waldron have come to a similar solution: turning from 
the fight over normative choices to building consensus about the 
process used to resolve that contest.56 Law’s historic focus on process 
can serve debates over Internet censorship well. Thus, this Article 
argues that to assess whether a given approach to censorship is 
legitimate, legal scholars need an analytical tool that recognizes 
different tradeoffs but enables rigorous comparative analysis. 
B. A New Hope 
This Article proposes an alternative methodology that addresses 
these shortcomings: a process-oriented framework to evaluate the 
legitimacy of Internet filtering. The approach draws upon scholarship 
in deliberative democracy, health care decisionmaking, labor and 
environmental law, and cyberlaw. To assess legitimacy, the 
Framework asks four questions. First, is the country open about its 
Internet censorship and why it restricts information? Second, is the 
state transparent about what material it filters and what it leaves 
untouched? Third, how narrow is the country’s filtering—that is, how 
well does the content actually blocked and not blocked by filtering 
correspond to the country’s filtering criteria? Finally, to what degree 
can citizens participate in decisionmaking about these restrictions, 
such that censors are accountable? Legitimate censorship is open, 
 
 53. See, e.g., Yahoo Criticized in Case of Jailed Dissident, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2007, at C3. 
 54. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REP. 7, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file553_14869.pdf (criticizing the Chinese 
search engine Baidu). 
 55. I thank Peter Hammer for this point. 
 56. See infra notes 181–85 and accompanying text. 
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transparent about banned content, effective yet narrowly targeted, 
and responsive to citizens’ preferences (but not overly so). 
Evaluating legitimacy from a process-oriented perspective does 
not replace values-driven normative analysis. Indeed, the Framework 
bolsters process-oriented examinations by enabling application of 
different normative models.57 If a state’s censorship program is openly 
and fully described, carefully targeted, and responsive to popular 
demand, then objections are properly aimed not at the state’s filtering 
program, but at the country’s larger values and policy choices. For 
example, Saudi Arabia might filter sites about minority faiths in a way 
that is straightforward, narrow, and popular, yet one might still find 
that decision unacceptable.58 The Framework’s goal is not to end 
analysis or discussions based on values, but to spark and clarify them. 
A process-based approach to this question best comports with the 
diversity of views on banning Internet materials. 
C. The Framework’s Roots 
The Framework’s approach is rooted in the law’s historical 
preoccupation with questions of process, and it parallels proposals 
based on deliberative democracy in other contested policy areas.59 
Similar tools have been deployed when multiple legitimate outcomes 
are possible and even likely, such as allocating health care and 
regulating working conditions. 
Process-based approaches often seek to mediate policy 
disagreements based on strongly held values, with the goal of 
convincing participants that an outcome is reasonable even if they 
disagree with it. Consider a dying patient in the United States who 
wants a health care plan to pay for experimental treatment.60 (Assume 
that the treatment may have clinical benefit, but it has not been 
proven effective.) The plan and the patient have different, competing 
 
 57. Jack Balkin, Beth Noveck, and Kermit Roosevelt propose an analogous method for 
rating Web sites’ content via application of different third-party “templates.” See Balkin et al., 
supra note 42, at 210. 
 58. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COUNTRY SUMMARY: SAUDI ARABIA (2008), 
http://hrw.org/wr2k8/pdfs/saudiarabia.pdf (assessing the human rights climate in Saudi Arabia). 
 59. See generally JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION (1991) (analyzing 
methods for combining political equality and deliberation); DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald C. Slye eds., 1999) (seeking to reconcile 
human rights and political deliberation). 
 60. See Norman Daniels & James E. Sabin, Last Chance Therapies and Managed Care: 
Pluralism, Fair Procedures, and Legitimacy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 27, 28. 
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value sets. The plan seeks to ensure all its members have access to 
scarce medical resources, discover new therapies through clinical 
trials, and avoid negative public attention. The patient wants to 
receive therapy that may extend her life, improve her life’s quality, or 
cure a disease. There is no single way to balance these competing 
claims; it may be reasonable to provide women with breast cancer 
autologous bone marrow transplants61 but deny them access to 
experimental cancer drugs (which may be highly toxic).62 The health 
plan seeks outcomes that seem legitimate to affected patients, other 
members, and the public. 
Norman Daniels and James Sabin suggest that the keys to such 
legitimacy are process-oriented: making decisions public; explaining 
how decisions reasonably provide benefits to a heterogeneous group 
of members given resource constraints; allowing appeal; and creating 
regulation to enforce these factors.63 Daniels and Sabin extend the 
proposal to all limit-setting decisions by providers such as health 
management organizations (HMOs), arguing that decisionmaking 
criteria should be public, relevant, and subject to challenge, such that 
“all fair-minded parties” would agree they are germane.64 Patients or 
health plan accountants may disagree with a particular outcome—
and, given their differing preferences and values, one side is likely to 
do so—but they are more likely to accept the legitimacy of the 
outcome if they trust how the decision was made.65 As with 
censorship, allocating health care resources requires selecting from 
multiple legitimate options. Outcome-based normative analysis is not 
determinative, and so legitimacy must rest upon a process viewed as 
relevant and fair. 
Similarly, setting labor standards can result in multiple legitimate 
outcomes that prioritize different interests and values. Under 
 
 61. But see Peter D. Jacobson, Richard A. Rettig & Wade M. Aubry, Litigating the Science 
of Breast Cancer Treatment, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 785, 790 (2007) (noting that 
randomized clinical trials showed transplants to be no more effective than standard 
chemotherapy). 
 62. Cf. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 485 
F.3d 695, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1069 (2008) (finding no constitutional right 
to access experimental therapies). 
 63. See generally Daniels & Sabin, supra note 60 (analyzing the allocation of benefits 
among breast cancer patients). 
 64. Norman Daniels & James Sabin, The Ethics of Accountability in Managed Care 
Reform, 17 HEALTH AFF. 50, 57 (1998). 
 65. Id. at 59 (noting that with a legitimate process, “even those who say that the specific 
outcome is wrong must admit that it is a case of reasonable disagreement”). 
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pressure from activists, corporations have begun to adopt voluntary 
codes of conduct for working conditions.66 These codes, while 
oriented around the International Labour Organization’s principles, 
differ significantly in their requirements for issues such as wages, 
nondiscrimination, and freedom of association.67 Should factories pay 
workers (at least) the legal minimum wage, or a living wage?68 May 
they discriminate based on sexual orientation? (American federal 
employment law permits such discrimination;69 however, French law 
bans it.70) While participants tend to agree that labor regulation is 
needed, they diverge about what rules are proper. 
The Ratcheting Labor Standards (RLS) approach tackles this 
heterogeneity by combining voluntary regulation, monitoring, 
reporting, and external analysis to measure how well firms such as 
Nike comply with their adopted code of conduct.71 Companies select 
both the standards by which they are measured and the evaluator. 
Analysis and public scrutiny assess what behavior suffices for 
legitimacy and improve monitoring through feedback and 
competition. RLS inherently accepts that more than one labor code 
can be valid—standards for a factory in Vietnam will necessarily 
differ from those in Vienna.72 Rather than assessing labor standards 
from a single values-based perspective, RLS focuses on process: self-
regulation, checked by monitoring and disclosure, with feedback to 
refine standards, and thus develop legitimacy. 
 
 66. See generally Richard Locke et al., Beyond Corporate Codes of Conduct: Work 
Organization and Labour Standards at Nike’s Suppliers, 146 INT’L LABOR REV. 21, 22–24 (2007) 
(discussing Nike’s efforts to enforce minimum labor standards in the wake of public pressure). 
 67. See Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems of 
Labor Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 1, 7–9 (2003). 
 68. See id. at 9. 
 69. See, e.g., James E. Snyder & Reva S. Bauch, Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the 
Workplace, CHI. BAR ASS’N REC., Nov. 2006, at 44, 45. 
 70. Julie Chi-Hye Suk, Equal by Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 302–03 (2007). 
 71. Archon Fung, Dara O’Rourke & Charles Sabel, Realizing Labor Standards: How 
Transparency, Competition, and Sanctions Could Improve Working Conditions Worldwide, 
BOSTON REV., Feb.–Mar. 2001, at 4 [hereinafter Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards]; see 
also Archon Fung, Deliberative Democracy and International Labor Standards, 16 
GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. POL’Y, ADMIN., & INSTITUTIONS 51, 60 (2003) [hereinafter Fung, 
Deliberative Democracy]. 
 72. See Fung et al., Realizing Labor Standards, supra note 71, at 4 (“RLS encourages the 
incremental realization of demanding labor standards over time without imposing a uniform, 
and potentially protectionist, standard upon diverse contexts.”). 
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Regulation becomes more challenging when there are multiple 
sets of guiding norms with plausible claims to legitimacy. As health 
care rationing, working condition ordinances, and Internet filtering 
demonstrate, regulators should utilize an approach that allows 
different sets of tradeoffs and that achieves legitimacy through a 
rigorous, inclusive process. The next Part describes the application of 
this approach to Internet filtering by elucidating the four parts of this 
Article’s new, process-based evaluative method. 
II.  A METHOD IN FOUR PARTS 
To evaluate a country’s Internet filtering practices, the 
Framework assesses openness, transparency, narrowness, and 
accountability. These principles draw together common elements 
from scholarly analysis of Internet filtering and proposals to regulate 
it. These principles have not previously been used to create an 
integrated methodology, however. The goal of the Framework is to 
evaluate how well a country describes what it censors and why, 
whether it effectively blocks proscribed material while leaving 
permitted content untouched, and how much its citizens can 
participate in filtering decisions. 
A. Openness 
The Framework’s first criterion is openness: does the country 
admit to filtering the Internet and describe clearly its rationale for 
blocking? Whereas censorship that is clearly disclosed and carefully 
explained is more likely to be legitimate, censorship that is covert, or 
that rests on flimsy pretexts, is less acceptable. 
Compare Saudi Arabia and China, for example. Saudi Arabia 
prevents users from accessing most pornographic and erotic material, 
along with some pages on certain sects of Islam, other minority faiths, 
alcohol, and illegal drugs.73 The Kingdom is open about censorship: its 
Communications and Information Technology Commission explains 
the filtering on its Web site.74 Saudi Arabia justifies these practices by 
citing supporting materials that discuss social harms from 
pornography, such as the Koran, an article on Internet pornography 
 
 73. See OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN SAUDI ARABIA 3–5 (2009), 
http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_SaudiArabia_2009.pdf. 
 74. See Internet.gov.sa, Content Filtering in Saudi Arabia, http://www.internet.gov.sa/ 
learn-the-web/guides/content-filtering-in-saudi-arabia (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
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written by Cass Sunstein, and the 1986 U.S. Attorney General’s 
Commission on Pornography.75 Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s Council of 
Ministers promulgated a 2001 resolution describing prohibited 
Internet content, including material “breaching public decency,” 
“infringing the sanctity of Islam,” and running “contrary to the state 
or its system.”76 Finally, users who attempt to reach a filtered site 
receive a “block page” to inform them that the disruption is 
deliberate.77 
Saudi Arabia discloses its online censorship and elucidates its 
underlying rationales. China, by contrast, operates the world’s most 
extensive and sophisticated Internet censorship system, yet rarely 
admits that the country filters information.78 The Chinese filtering 
apparatus is multilayered.79 Users are not informed when they are 
prevented from reaching proscribed material; instead, their Internet 
connections are reset, or their e-mail messages never reach their 
destinations.80 Intentional censorship is difficult to distinguish from 
technical errors. Queries for sensitive terms, such as “free tibet,” on 
Chinese search engines generate results that deliberately purge 
blocked sites.81 (Some search engines voluntarily notify users that 
 
 75. Internet Servs. Unit, King Abdulaziz City for Sci. & Tech., Introduction to Content 
Filtering, http://www.isu.net.sa/saudi-internet/contenet-filtring/filtring.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 
2009). 
 76. Arab Media: Saudi Internet Rules, Council of Ministers Resolution (Feb. 12, 2001), 
http://www.al-bab.com/media/docs/saudi.htm. 
 77. See Internet.gov.sa, New Block Page, http://www.internet.gov.sa/news/new-block-page/ 
view?set_language=en (last visited Oct. 23, 2009) (describing and linking to the block page that 
a user will receive when trying to reach a filtered site). See generally Alfred Hermida, Saudis 
Block 2,000 Websites, BBC NEWS, July 31, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2153312. 
stm (discussing Saudi Arabia’s Internet filtering practice). 
 78. See, e.g., Access to Information and Media Control in the People’s Republic of China: 
Hearing Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission, 110th Cong. 77 (2006) 
(statement of Dr. Ronald J. Deibert, Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of 
Citizen Lab, University of Toronto), available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2008hearings/ 
transcripts/08_06_18trans/08_06_18_trans.pdf (“Official acknowledgement of these practices has 
been inconsistent at best, deceitful at worst.”); Declan McCullagh, China: We Don’t Censor the 
Internet. Really, CNET NEWS, Oct. 31, 2006, http://news.cnet.com/China-We-dont-censor-the-
Internet.-Really/2100-1028_3-6130970.html (“In China, we don't have software blocking 
Internet sites. . . . We do not have restrictions at all.” (quoting a Chinese government official)). 
See generally OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 13 (describing China’s Internet filtering system); 
Carolyn Duffy Marsan, Chinese Internet Censorship: An Inside Look, NETWORK WORLD, May 
12, 2008, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/051208-china-internet.html (same). 
 79. OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 13, at 9. 
 80. Id. at 17, 22. 
 81. OpenNet Initiative, Probing Chinese Search Engine Filtering (Aug. 19, 2004), http:// 
opennet.net/bulletins/005/. 
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results are censored.82) Even users who are generally aware that 
China prevents access to some material may be frustrated in 
attempting to determine what content is blocked, and why. China’s 
lack of openness is pernicious. Many Internet users do not know they 
are operating in an information environment deliberately skewed by 
the government; formally, they have no reason to be wary because 
China does not usually admit to filtering. 
Yet openness is easy to achieve. Nearly all filtering technology 
can display a block page when a user is prevented from accessing 
banned material.83 The page, which can be customized, informs the 
user that their inability to reach a Web site is a deliberate policy 
choice rather than a technical error.84 It is easy and inexpensive to be 
open about filtering. Countries that nonetheless obfuscate their 
censorship—such as Uzbekistan, which redirects users from banned 
sites to innocuous ones—seek to conceal this filtering from citizens.85 
Governments generally advance two reasons for censoring the 
Net. The first reason offered for filtering is that banned content 
harms the community, regardless of any individual benefit. Singapore 
bans “material that is objectionable on the grounds of public interest, 
public morality, public order, public security, [and] national 
harmony.”86 The second reason offered for filtering is that filtered 
material harms the individual, who may not realize the danger of the 
material or who may find it attractive nonetheless. Vietnam claims its 
censorship “policy is to apply measures to prevent youngsters from 
unhealthy sites.”87 Neither of these rationales is strengthened by 
undisclosed restrictions—rather, notice that a country blocks access 
reinforces the material’s harmfulness and the societal judgment that it 
 
 82. Nart Villeneuve, Perspectives on Transparency (June 26, 2008), http://www.nartv.org/ 
2008/06/26/perspectives-on-transparency/. 
 83. See, e.g., CISCO SYSTEMS, CISCO SECURITY APPLIANCE COMMAND LINE 
CONFIGURATION GUIDE, VERSION 7.2–CONFIGURING HTTP FILTERING (2008), http://www. 
cisco.com/en/US/docs/security/asa/asa72/configuration/guide/filter.html#wp1042538 (explaining 
how to configure HTTP filtering so that users are redirected to a block page when trying to 
reach a blocked site). 
 84. See, e.g., Internet.gov.sa, supra note 77. 
 85. Robert Faris & Nart Villeneuve, Measuring Global Internet Filtering, in ACCESS 
DENIED, supra note 9, at 5, 13. 
 86. Internet Code of Practice § 4(1) (1997) (Singapore), available at http://www.mda.gov. 
sg/wms.file/mobj/mobj.981.internet_code_of_practice.pdf. 
 87. Politics a No-No but Porn OK, AUSTRALIAN, Aug. 15, 2006, at 33 (quoting Vietnamese 
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Le Dung). 
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deserves to be proscribed.88 In short, countries confident that 
censorship advances their citizens’ welfare have no reason to hide 
their actions. Countries that disclose restrictions are more likely to 
have legitimate controls rather than ones designed to protect those 
governing, but not the governed. 
The openness criterion probes whether a state admits that it 
censors the Internet and why. 
B. Transparency 
The Framework’s second prong is transparency: is the country 
clear about what material it filters, and is the country specific about 
the criteria it uses to determine which material to block? Transparent 
categories and criteria allow users to assess how the list of banned 
content maps onto the government’s rationales for information 
control. A country that filters the Internet to prevent harm to minors, 
for example, could plausibly censor Web sites offering medication 
without a prescription,89 violent games,90 or encouragement for 
anorexia.91 A system targeting sexually explicit material could 
potentially block sites ranging from pornography to lingerie catalogs 
to sex education. Thailand censors pornography;92 Iran blocks 
 
 88. See Schultz, supra note 33, at 823–28 (describing judging as catharsis). There may be a 
“forbidden fruit” appeal to banned material, but it seems more likely to attract users to specific 
contraband content, rather than general categories of sites. 
 89. Cf. Erik Eckholm, Abuses Are Found in Online Sales of Medication, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 
2008, at A21 (discussing possible solutions to the problem that “anyone of any age can obtain 
dangerous and addictive prescription drugs with the click of a mouse,” including requiring 
certification for online pharmacies). 
 90. Cf. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions on the Protection of Consumers, in Particular Minors, in Respect 
of the Use of Video Games, at 8 COM (2008) 207 final (Apr. 22, 2008), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0207:FIN:EN:PDF (recommending a 
“swift and effective mechanism for age verification” to protect minors from harmful online 
video games). 
 91. See, e.g., Doreen Carvajal, French Legislators Approve Law Against Web Sites 
Encouraging Anorexia and Bulimia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/04/15/world/europe/15iht-paris.4.12015888.html; cf. Thomas Catan, Online Anorexia Sites 
Shut Down Amid Claims They Glorify Starvation, TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 22, 2007, http://www. 
timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/health/article2916356.ece (discussing Spain’s decision to 
shut down four pro-anorexia websites after receiving a complaint that they were endangering 
the lives of teenage girls). 
 92. OPENNET INITIATIVE, THAILAND 4 (2007), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ 
thailand.pdf. 
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provocative attire sites as well;93 Saudi Arabia adds family planning 
sites.94 Rationales are general. Transparency presses a state to go 
beyond the reasons for filtering and explain precisely which content 
runs counter to its goals. 
Disclosure also pushes a government to go on record about the 
types of content it purports to block; testing (covered in the next 
Section, under narrowness) reveals the accuracy of those statements. 
Transparency extends the openness analysis. A country could be open 
without being transparent. For example, Tunisia blocks information 
“likely to upset public order”95 and “contrary to public order and 
good morals”96 but disguises what it actually censors.97 When users try 
to reach a filtered site, they get an error message stating the site is 
unavailable, rather than one indicating it is blocked. It is also possible 
to have transparency without openness: China hedges about whether 
it filters, but some domestic search engines disclose when they censor 
query results.98 Yahoo!’s Chinese search engine is a contrast in 
transparency: it lists sites censored for copyright violations,99 but does 
not list those blocked for political reasons.100 Openness assesses 
whether a state discloses why it censors. Transparency evaluates 
whether it describes what it censors. 
States can disclose what material they block either formally, such 
as through codification in press regulations,101 or informally, such as in 
 
 93. OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN IRAN 9 (2009), http://opennet.net/sites/ 
opennet.net/files/ONI_Iran_2009.pdf. 
 94. OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 73, at 5. 
 95. OPENNET INITIATIVE, TUNISIA 3 (2007), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ 
tunisia.pdf (quoting Art. 9, DECREE OF THE MINISTRY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS OF MARCH 
22, 1997, and Art. 9, CODE DE LA PRESSE (translated by Harvard Law School Langdell 
Library)). 
 96. Id. (citing Art. 49, DECREE OF THE MINISTRY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS OF MARCH 
22, 1997 (translated by Harvard Law School Langdell Library)). 
 97. Tunisia displays a “404 Not Found” error page (stating that the site does not exist or 
cannot be found) rather than a “403 Forbidden” page (stating that the user may not reach the 
requested site). Id.; Nart Villeneuve, Tunisia: Internet Filtering (June 7, 2005), http://www. 
nartv.org/2005/06/07/tunisia-internet-filtering/. 
 98. Villeneuve, supra note 82 (suggesting that Western search engines such as Google have 
established a norm of transparency). 
 99. See http://search.help.cn.yahoo.com/h3_9.html. 
 100. Nart Villeneuve, Search Monitor Project: Toward a Measure of Transparency 7 (Citizen 
Lab, Occasional Paper No. 1, 2008), http://www.citizenlab.org/papers/searchmonitor.pdf. 
 101. Iran’s Press Law of 2000, for example, prohibits insulting Islam, attacking the Leader of 
the Iranian Revolution, or quoting articles from groups opposing Islam. OPENNET INITIATIVE, 
supra note 93, at 4–5. 
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statements by government officials.102 Formal criteria are more 
transparent; citizens have greater access to documented rules than to 
oral utterances. Clarity in blocking disclosure varies greatly. France 
requires filtering of hate speech,103 which is well-defined under its civil 
and criminal laws as targeting a person or group based on their origin, 
ethnic group, nationality, race, or religion.104 China, by contrast, is 
vague about the material it filters, typically describing it as 
“unhealthy,”105 “spread[ing] rumours,”106 “destroy[ing] national 
unity,”107 or even just not “wholesome.”108 Moreover, China’s formal 
regulation of Internet content comprises a morass of statutes, 
regulations, and decrees from numerous government entities.109 This 
complicates determining what content is subject to censorship. 
China’s opacity is deliberate: it presses online service providers such 
as Google and Sina to censor widely, given that the consequences of 
erroneously allowing access to prohibited material can include loss of 
an operating license or even criminal sanctions.110 It is more difficult 
to assess what types of content are subject to blocking in China than 
in France; therefore, France’s censorship is more transparent overall 
than China’s censorship. 
In addition to disclosing what content is filtered, states vary in 
how clearly they describe criteria for determining whether material is 
proscribed. More precise definitions enhance transparency. For 
 
 102. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 103. OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 15; see also, e.g., Tribunal de Grande Instance 
[T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 20, 2000, Ordonnance de référé 
(Order for Summary Judgment), No. RG 00/05308, at 3, available at http://www.juriscom.net/ 
txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20001120.pdf (requiring Yahoo!’s French subsidiary to disable access to 
auctions of Nazi memorabilia). 
 104. Arts. 23–24, Law on Press Freedom, J.O., July 29, 1881, at 4202, available at http:// 
www.lexinter.net/lois/provocation_aux_crimes_et_delits.htm (translation by author). 
 105. Ben Blanchard, China Won’t Guarantee Web Freedom over Olympics, REUTERS, May 
8, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/GCA-Olympics/idUSPEK14583520080508 (quoting 
Technology Minister Wan Gang). 
 106. Mark O’Neill, Beijing Closes Net Around Web Sites, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 4, 
2000, at 10. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Marsan, supra note 78. 
 109. Melinda Liu & Quindlen Krovatin, Big Brother Is Talking, NEWSWEEK (PACIFIC ED.), 
Oct. 17, 2005, at 20 (estimating thirty-eight different regulations); Cong.-Executive Comm’n on 
China, Agencies Responsible for Censorship in China, http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/ 
exp/expcensors.php (last visited Oct. 23, 2009) (listing nine governmental agencies). 
 110. See, e.g., Clive Thompson, Google’s China Problem (and China’s Google Problem), 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 23, 2006, at 64 (describing Chinese pressure to censor and Google’s 
acquiescence). 
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example, blocking “child pornography,”111 when that material is 
defined carefully in a state’s criminal code,112 is more transparent than 
banning “nudity”113 when that content includes pornographic images, 
pictures of Michelangelo’s statue of David, and photos of prisoner 
abuse at Abu Ghraib.114 The clearer the criteria, the less discretion 
government officials or ISPs have to define other sites as proscribed. 
Uzbekistan’s Law on Principles and Guarantees on Access to 
Information permits restricting information “in the name of 
maintaining safety and protecting the moral values of society”—a 
vague guideline that offers cover for censoring political opposition 
sites and coverage critical of the authoritarian government.115 
Generality in defining what material is subject to filtering confers 
considerable power on censors, whose ad hoc judgments are more 
difficult to challenge when criteria are broad and can act as a pretext 
for covert censorship. 
Transparency checks how clearly a state describes the material 
that it seeks to block. It enables comparison between stated motives 
and the content a state targets based on these motives. Transparent 
censorship specifies both the categories of banned content and rules 
for determining whether material falls within them. Together, 
transparency and openness reveal a sovereign’s public claims about 
its information control. 
C. Narrowness 
The third criterion of the Framework is narrowness: how closely 
does empirical data about what a country actually blocks match the 
government’s description of its censorship? This Framework prong 
 
 111. E.g., Cybertip.ca, supra note 48 (describing a system deployed in Canada to “prevent 
access to . . . child pornography images”). 
 112. CRIMINAL CODE, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 163.1(1) (1985) (Can.) (defining “child 
pornography”). 
 113. See McAfee, 4.x Database: Secure Computing, http://www.securecomputing.com/index. 
cfm?skey=86#categories (last visited Oct. 23, 2009) (defining nudity as “non-pornographic 
images of the bare human body”). 
 114. See, e.g., Xeni Jardin, BoingBoing Banned in UAE, Qatar, Elsewhere, BOING BOING, 
Feb. 27, 2006, http://www.boingboing.net/2006/02/27/boingboing-banned-in.html (describing the 
blocking of the blog Boing Boing because the filtering software SmartFilter classified it as 
“nudity” even though less than 1 percent of posts contain nudity). 
 115. Inera Safargalieva, Uzbek Media and the Authorities—A Strange Relationship, in Fifth 
Central Asian Media Conference, Sep. 17–18, 2003, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the 
Media, Central Asia—In Defence of the Future 259, 263, available at http://www.osce.org/ 
publications/rfm/2004/02/12243_101_en.pdf. 
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validates the claims a state makes (if any) about its filtering through 
empirical testing by third parties. The openness and transparency 
criteria assess what a country says about its censorship; the 
narrowness criterion examines what it does. 
Narrowness considers both overinclusiveness and 
underinclusiveness. Most, if not all, Internet filtering systems will be 
overbroad (blocking innocent content), underbroad (failing to block 
proscribed material), or both. Both overinclusion and underinclusion 
are problematic. Overbroad filtering keeps citizens from accessing 
legitimate material. Underbroad blocking means a country fails to 
censor content it views as dangerous. 
Overinclusive censorship can be deliberate or inadvertent. 
Vietnam claims to only filter Web sites that are harmful to minors, yet 
its system concentrates on ensuring that political opposition sites 
remain inaccessible.116 This is a deliberate strategy to protect 
Vietnam’s single-party Communist system.117 Overbreadth may also 
represent a considered policy choice to tolerate false positive results 
to minimize false negative ones. Inadvertent filtering can result from 
classification errors, such as when Secure Computing’s SmartFilter 
software categorized a Kentucky newspaper as pornography,118 or 
from crude censorship techniques, such as when ISPs prevented 
access to over a million unrelated Web sites to filter 400 with child 
pornography, at Pennsylvania’s behest.119 
Underinclusive censorship occurs when users can routinely reach 
banned content. (This differs from accessing blocked content via 
circumvention techniques that deliberately evade filtering.120) 
 
 116. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 117. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS & LABOR, 
VIETNAM: 2007 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (2008), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100543.htm (describing Vietnam’s efforts to restrict 
publication of alternative political viewpoints and its Internet censorship practices). 
 118. OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES IN 
2004–2005: A COUNTRY STUDY 13 n.50 (2005), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_ 
UAE_Country_Study.pdf. 
 119. Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 633–34, 650–52, 655 (E.D. 
Pa. 2004). 
 120. See generally Nart Villeneuve, Technical Ways to Get Round Censorship, in 
REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, HANDBOOK FOR BLOGGERS AND CYBER-DISSIDENTS 
(2005), available at http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/handbook_bloggers_cyberdissidents-GB.pdf 
(providing a list of filter-circumvention techniques and their associated advantages and 
disadvantages); Hiawatha Bray, Beating Censorship on the Internet, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 20, 
2006, at A10 (discussing the use of networks of proxies to obfuscate web-surfers’ computer 
identities). 
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Singapore operates an underinclusive filtering system by design; 
though all pornography is eligible for blocking, only a few sites are 
symbolically targeted.121 
Countries can have both overbroad and underbroad censorship. 
Vietnam’s filtering demonstrates both flaws: it fails to block any 
pornographic sites, which are formally banned, but heavily censors 
political sites.122 Australia blocks some—but by no means all—
pornographic sites, yet also censors a dentist and a canine kennel.123 
Commentary on filtering tends to ignore the problem of 
underinclusion. Underbroad censorship, however, causes concern for 
three reasons. First, assuming that a country adequately justifies 
blocking access to harmful content, allowing users to view it is 
undesirable. In 2006, British Telecom detected 35,000 daily attempts 
to access child pornography.124 Until the end of 2007, however, it was 
the only British ISP to block such attempts.125 If child pornography 
should be censored, then allowing users to see it because of different 
ISP practices is normatively problematic.126 
Second, censorship that targets some, but not all, content that is 
nominally proscribed may enable selective enforcement. Egypt has 
used a court decision that sanctioned the blocking of sites threatening 
national security to prevent online access to Muslim Brotherhood, the 
country’s major political opposition movement.127 Censorship 
 
 121. OPENNET INITIATIVE, SINGAPORE 1 (2007), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ 
singapore.pdf. 
 122. OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 116, at 4; see also supra note 87 and accompanying 
text. 
 123. David Kravets, WikiLeaks Exposes Australian Blacklist, WIRED, Mar. 19, 2009, 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/03/wikileaks-expos/. The list is available at http://www. 
wikileaks.org/wiki/Australian_government_secret_ACMA_internet_censorship_blacklist%2C_
18_Mar_2009. 
 124. Tim Richardson, Cleanfeed Working Overtime, Says BT, REGISTER, Feb. 7, 2006, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/02/07/bt_cleanfeed_iwf/. 
 125. Britain’s other ISPs “voluntarily” adopted Cleanfeed by the end of 2007, as demanded 
by UK Home Office Minister Vernon Croaker. Frank Fisher, Caught in the Web, GUARDIAN, 
Jan. 17, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jan/17/caughtintheweb. 
 126. But see Richard Clayton, Failures in a Hybrid Content Blocking System, in PRIVACY 
ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES: 5TH INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP PET 2005, at 78, 82–89 
(George Danezis & David Martin eds., 2006) (describing technical problems with Cleanfeed and 
demonstrating how it can be used to create an index of child pornography sites). 
 127. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COUNTRY PROFILES: EGYPT (2005), http://www.hrw.org/ 
reports/2005/mena1105/4.htm; see also Sarah El Sirgany, Al-Ahram Reverses Internet Block on 
Blogs, DAILY NEWS EGYPT, Aug. 15, 2006, available at http://www.dailystaregypt.com/article. 
aspx?ArticleID=2615. 
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becomes a weapon in a government’s arsenal, deployed arbitrarily 
rather than enforced consistently. 
Finally, filtering that fails to block forbidden material—
especially badly flawed or nominal blocking—undercuts the 
justification for restricting access. The rationale for censorship is that 
some content is sufficiently harmful to warrant suppression; if much 
of it remains available, the country’s efforts are likely pretextual. 
Therefore, assessing whether a state’s censorship is underbroad, 
overbroad, or both, requires careful empirical testing. This is 
challenging; the number of Web sites is effectively infinite, and testing 
even a representative sample is nearly impossible. Watchdog 
organizations such as the OpenNet Initiative, Human Rights Watch, 
and Reporters Without Borders employ two approaches. First, they 
test an index of popular Web sites in a representative set of categories 
(such as news sources, human rights, and pornography) that may be 
blocked.128 Second, they check sites on topics sensitive to a given 
country, such as pages about the Falun Gong movement in China.129 
For countries employing commercial filtering software, they can 
check sites with known categories to establish which ones that nation 
wants to block.130 
In future research, particularly under the Framework’s aegis, 
testing that assesses narrowness should include a range of sites in 
zones of content a state has vowed to restrict, in areas it is suspected 
of covertly filtering (if any), and in categories that other states block. 
The first list checks the effectiveness of a country’s blocking. The 
second and third evaluate whether the government is forthright about 
material it restricts. 
Testing results show what types of sites a country filters (though 
not a comprehensive list of blocked sites). This empirical data also 
demonstrates underbreadth and overbreadth, along with how broad 
 
 128. See, e.g., OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN VIETNAM IN 2005–2006: A 
COUNTRY STUDY app. 2 (2006), http://opennet.net/studies/vietnam (displaying which sites on 
ONI’s “[G]lobal List” were blocked in Vietnam); see also id. § 3.A (describing testing 
methodology). 
 129. See, e.g., Paul Wiseman, In China, a Battle over Web Censorship, USA TODAY, Apr. 23, 
2008, at 1A (describing searches for specific banned keywords on the Internet in China); 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHINA: WORLD REPORT 2007 (2007), http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/ 
docs/2007/01/11/china14867.htm (describing China’s official reaction to Falun Gong); see also 
REPORTERS SANS FRONTIÈRES, INTERNET ENEMIES 19–20 (2009), http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/ 
Internet_enemies_2009_2_-3.pdf (providing a list of specific sites censored within Syria). 
 130. See infra note 319. 
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(measured by the number of categories filtered) and deep (measured 
by the percentage of sites per category) overblocking and 
underblocking is.131 This enables comparison of a country’s actions to 
its rhetoric. 
One normative challenge with the narrowness evaluation is 
deciding whether a site—blocked or unblocked—falls within the 
parameters of what a country claims to filter. The more vague or 
unclear the criteria, the more likely a site will fall within prohibited 
content, or at least its penumbra. This uncertainty may be useful: it 
can reveal innocent content that is swept up for blocking. Some 
material is inherently susceptible to multiple classifications: gay or 
lesbian dating sites may be blocked because a country objects to 
dating services,132 discussion of gay and lesbian issues,133 or both.134 
Categorizing content involves subjective decisions; censors may be 
lax, strict, or simply wrong. Some overblocking and underblocking is 
likely even in a carefully defined, narrowly implemented filtering 
regime. Assessing legitimacy, in terms of narrowness, is likely to 
reveal a spectrum of practices rather than binary distinctions. 
The three factors discussed thus far interoperate. Openness 
assesses how straightforward a country is in revealing its reasons for 
censorship. Transparency maps the content the country purports to 
restrict. And narrowness checks how successful the country’s filtering 
program is and whether it suppresses different matter than it claims. 
D. Accountability 
The Framework’s fourth criterion is accountability: to what 
degree can citizens influence policymaking regarding what content is 
censored? What measures or structures push officials to respond to 
constituents? What recourse is available to content owners who 
contend that they have been blocked erroneously? 
The accountability criterion assesses how closely a country’s 
censorship aligns with its citizens’ views. It also considers how 
responsive blocking practices are to changes in those views. 
Accountability has four major aspects: participation in censorship 
 
 131. See Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 85, at 11, 18–20 (describing a method for testing 
Internet filtering and then listing results of those tests). 
 132. See OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 45, at 6. 
 133. See, e.g., OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN YEMEN 4 (2009), http:// 
opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Yemen_2009.pdf. 
 134. See OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 93. 
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decisions, specification of authority, opportunity to challenge, and 
countermajoritarian constraints. 
1. Participation.  The accountability criterion’s participation 
prong looks both at whether citizens influence the state’s decision to 
block access to Internet material at all and at whether citizens 
influence the state’s subsequent selection of sites to filter. The most 
accountable method of developing a state filtering program involves a 
democratic government’s adoption of a filtering policy after public 
debate.135 Though it has faced significant criticism,136 the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) enacted by the United States in 
1998137 is a good example of an accountable filtering program: it 
enjoyed public hearings and was widely supported in Congress.138 
Under the DMCA, online service providers must filter access to 
allegedly copyright-infringing materials139—either on their servers or 
in search results—to obtain safe harbor from secondary liability.140 
Filtering emerged from an established, participatory public regulation 
process. 
Citizens can participate in shaping a state’s filtering policy 
indirectly, by electing a government that implements online 
restrictions, and directly, by suggesting or “tagging” sites for addition 
to a block list. France’s Interior Minister announced that French ISPs 
had agreed, after negotiations with the government, to filter sites 
containing child pornography, terrorism, or hate speech.141 French 
users can submit suspect sites, and the government then decides 
 
 135. Michael Best and Keegan Wade propose a quantitative measure of how democratic a 
country’s Internet regulation is. Michael L. Best & Keegan W. Wade, Democratic and Anti-
Democratic Regulators of the Internet: A Framework, 23 INFO. SOC’Y 405, 410 (2007). 
 136. See, e.g., David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 739–40 (2000); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital 
Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 519, 534–37 (1999). But see Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the 
Process of Fair Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 67 (2006). 
 137. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified 
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 138. The DMCA passed unanimously. Urban & Quilter, supra note 16, at 635. 
 139. See, e.g., Chris Sherman, Google Makes Scientology Infringement Demand Public, 
SEARCH ENGINE WATCH, Apr. 15, 2002, http://searchenginewatch.com/2159691; Google Asked 
to Delist Scientology Critics (#1), CHILLING EFFECTS CLEARINGHOUSE, Mar. 8, 2002, http:// 
www.chillingeffects.org/dmca512/notice.cgi?NoticeID=232. 
 140. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)–(d) (2006). 
 141. France Blocks Online Child Porn, Terrorism, Racism, USA TODAY, June 10, 2008, 
available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/world/2008-06-10-france-online-porn_N.htm. 
BAMBAUER IN FINAL 11/6/2009  1:58:21 PM 
402 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:377 
whether to include them on the list blocked by ISPs.142 Thus, French 
citizens guide general censorship as well as specific filtering decisions. 
Democratic government does not, however, guarantee 
participation. Thailand generally functions as a democracy (albeit 
with intermittent military coups143), but it operates a censorship 
regime with minimal citizen participation.144 The Thai government 
must theoretically obtain a court order to force ISPs to block a Web 
site, but a government minister in May 2008 unilaterally ordered 
filtering of a prominent independent news portal and a social criticism 
site, both with popular discussion boards.145 
It is increasingly difficult to assess whether a country is 
“democratic,” and using formal structures of government as a reliable 
indicator of accountability is becoming problematic.146 For example, a 
country may have the outward indicators of democratic governance, 
yet subvert them via voter intimidation, arbitrary arrest, media 
control, and state ownership of key information outlets. Russia,147 
Venezuela,148 and Zimbabwe149 are examples of states in which the 
 
 142. U.S., France Move to Block Online Child Pornography, CBC NEWS, June 10, 2008, 
http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2008/06/10/isps-porn-block.html. 
 143. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Ousted Premier Is Set to Return to Thailand, Officials Say, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2008, at A4 (discussing the return of the former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra after being ousted in a 2006 military coup). 
 144. OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 92, at 3. 
 145. It is not clear whether the Thai government has legal authority to censor the Internet at 
all. ACCESS DENIED, supra note 9, at 158–59; C.J. Hinke, Censoring Free Speech in Thailand, 
GLOBAL VOICES ADVOCACY, May 17, 2008, http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2008/05/17/ 
censoring-free-speech-in-thailand/. 
 146. See generally Andreas Schedler, The Menu of Manipulation, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 36 
(2002) (“[Transitions from authoritarian rule] have given birth to new forms of authoritarianism 
that do not fit into our classic categories of one party, military, or personal dictatorship. They 
have produced regimes that hold elections and tolerate some pluralism and interparty 
competition, but at the same time violate minimal democratic norms so severely and 
systematically that it makes no sense to classify them as democracies, however qualified.”). 
 147. See, e.g., Clifford J. Levy, Putin Aide Secures His Assured Victory in Russian Vote, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2008, at A3 (“Throughout the campaign, the Kremlin, having essentially 
prevented any meaningful opposition, focused on getting enough people to the polls to allow 
the vote to be depicted as legitimate.”); Russia Goes to the Polls, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Nov. 
29, 2007, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/11/29/russia17440.htm (noting that Russian citizens 
will be going to the polls “in a deteriorating human rights situation where fundamental 
freedoms vital to free and fair elections are curtailed”). 
 148. See, e.g., Fabiola Sanchez, Venezuela’s Chavez Pushes Through 26 Decrees, USA 
TODAY, Aug. 5, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-08-05-
2755377644_x.htm (reporting that the new laws enacted by presidential decree aim to move 
Venezuela toward a “centralized, state-run economic system”). 
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appearance of democracy can be at odds with the reality of 
governance, and in which accountability is diminishing. 
Even U.S. efforts can generate accountability problems. In June 
2008, New York’s Attorney General pressed three major ISPs to drop 
a wide range of Usenet news groups—only eighty-eight of which had 
illicit material—to reduce online distribution of child pornography.150 
By July 2008, AT&T and AOL agreed to do so as well.151 Beyond 
narrowness concerns, the agreement with the Attorney General limits 
Usenet access for all of the providers’ customers, not just those in 
New York.152 Customers in other states, however, cannot hold a New 
York official accountable. Other regulators, state or federal, might 
have sought a different solution. For example, they might have 
included other major ISPs (such as Comcast153), narrowed the 
restrictions (perhaps to the eighty-eight groups with unlawful 
images), or broadened the blocking to include Web sites with child 
pornography (as initial reports indicated that New York had 
required154). Other states have begun to echo New York’s demands of 
ISPs,155 increasing the likelihood of fragmented regulation and 
diminished accountability. 
Conversely, some citizen participation in developing filtering 
policy is possible even in the absence of democratic government. For 
 
 149. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ALL OVER AGAIN: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND 
FLAWED ELECTORAL CONDITIONS IN ZIMBABWE’S COMING GENERAL ELECTIONS (2008), 
http://hrw.org/reports/2008/zimbabwe0308/ (noting that Zimbabwe’s “deeply flawed and rushed 
electoral process,” and the government’s “continuing violations of civil and political rights” 
make it unlikely that upcoming elections “will help Zimbabwe either establish democracy or 
bring an end to the country’s ongoing political crisis”); Celia W. Dugger & Barry Bearak, 
Mugabe Rival Quits Zimbabwe Runoff, Citing Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2008, at A1 (“It 
remains to be seen whether southern Africa’s leaders will collectively censure [the incumbent 
president] or take tougher steps, such as economic sanctions, to isolate his government. They 
have never done so before, despite [previous] elections . . . that were widely believed to have 
been marked by rigging and fraud, but that his regional peers declared legitimate.”). 
 150. McCullagh, supra note 3. 
 151. Linda Rosencrance, ISPs Join to Block Child Porn, PC WORLD, July 13, 2008, 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/148295/isps_join_to_block_child_porn.html. 
 152. Hakim, supra note 3. 
 153. Comcast was the second-largest U.S. ISP for the third quarter of 2008. Alex Goldman, 
Top 23 U.S. ISPs by Subscriber: Q3 2008, ISP-PLANET, Dec. 2, 2008, http://www.isp-planet.com/ 
research/rankings/usa.html. 
 154. Peter Grier, ISPs Take Major Step in Curbing Child Porn, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
June 11, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0611/p01s09-usgn.html; see also 
Hakim, supra note 3. 
 155. See, e.g., Marguerite Reardon, California Pols Ask ISPs to Block Child Porn, CNET 
NEWS, June 20, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9973966-7.html. 
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example, Saudi Arabia permits only limited political participation,156 
but it invites local users to suggest sites that should be blocked or to 
challenge a decision to censor material. The Saudi censors receive 
hundreds of requests each day to censor additional material (but only 
a few to unblock sites).157 Such participation has had some effect, 
though it has been limited in scope. In 2001, a Saudi official reported 
that 30 percent of requests to block additional sites resulted in 
additions to the Kingdom’s “black list,” and 3 percent of requests to 
unblock material were granted.158 This example demonstrates that, 
even if citizens have limited participation in a state’s governance, they 
may be able to shape the state’s Internet censorship. 
2. Delineated Authority.  The accountability criterion also takes 
into account whether citizens are able to hold government censors to 
task. This assessment is eased considerably when the basis for 
censorship is specified formally. The codification of censorship 
criteria not only puts citizens on notice regarding prohibited content 
but also constrains blocking decisions. When challenging a censor’s 
decision is not possible, filtering that is at odds with a country’s rules 
detracts from its legitimacy. And when citizens can contest 
censorship, such contradictions weaken the basis for upholding it. 
Italy passed legislation in 2005159 allowing a government agency 
to specify gambling sites that Italian ISPs must block (namely, sites 
that did not register with the agency).160 The agency created and 
published a list of the sites in February 2006.161 Thus, online gambling 
 
 156. See FREEDOM HOUSE, SAUDI ARABIA: 2007 (2007), http://www.freedomhouse.org/ 
template.cfm?page=22&year=2007&country=7265 (“Saudi Arabia organized elections for 
municipal councils in the first half of 2004, giving Saudi men a limited opportunity to select 
some of their leaders at the local level.”). 
 157. Robin Miller, Meet Saudi Arabia’s Most Famous Computer Expert, LINUX.COM, Jan. 
14, 2004, http://linux.com/archive/articles/33695. 
 158. ABDULAZIZ HAMAD AL-ZOMAN, THE INTERNET IN SAUDI ARABIA (TECHNICAL 
VIEW) 26–28 (2001), available at http://www.isu.net.sa/library/CETEM2001-Zoman.pdf. 
 159. Disposizioni per la Formazione del Bilancio Annuale e Pluriennale dello Stato (Legge 
Finanziaria 2006) [Orders Concerning the Formation of the Annual and Multi-Year State 
Budgets (Budget Law 2006)], Dec. 29, 2005, Gazz. Uff. No. 302, available at http://www.camera. 
it/parlam/leggi/05266l.htm. 
 160. Andrea Glorioso, Betting Websites Are Blocked in Italy, EUR. DIGITAL RIGHTS, June 
21, 2006, http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number4.12/italybetting. 
 161. Elenco di Cui al Decreto del Direttore Generale di AAMS 7 febbraio 2006 Relativo 
alla Rimozione dei Casi di Offerta in Assenza di Autorizzazione, Attraverso Rete Telematica, 
di Giochi “[List Pursuant to the Decree of the Director General of the AAMS (Autonomous 
State Monopolies Administration on Technical Regulations) of 7 February 2006 on the 
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enterprises knew whether they had been filtered, and why. Indeed, 
Malta-based bookmaker Astrabet successfully challenged its ban in 
court.162 Specifying the criteria for filtering and the individual sites to 
be blocked limited the government’s discretion in banning online 
content and enabled the affected sites to contest blacklisting. 
Formalizing censorship standards, though, may not sufficiently 
constrain officials—or provide grounds to argue that a ban 
contravenes applicable law. Singapore, for example, carefully 
specifies its filtering requirements via statute (the Media 
Development Authority Act163 and the Broadcasting Act164), 
regulation (broadcasting class licenses165), and ISP industry policy 
documents (the Media Development Authority’s Internet Code of 
Practice166). Singapore, however, broadly defines prohibited content—
such as content that is “objectionable on the grounds of public 
interest, public morality, public order, [or] public security.” These 
elastic guidelines provide discretion to government censors.167 
Although the putative focus of Singapore’s filtering is pornography, 
the government has employed these elastic guidelines to block 
popular gay and lesbian sites.168 The ability to argue that the 
government has exceeded its mandate is limited by the broad 
regulatory language defining what constitutes banned content. Thus, 
the case of Singapore demonstrates that even a country that specifies 
 
Prohibition of Gaming or Betting Through the Internet Without Authorization]”, 
AMMINISTRAZIONE AUTONOMA DEI MONOPOLI DI STATO, http://www.aams.it/site.php?page= 
20060213093814964& 
op=download. 
 162. Glorioso, supra note 160. 
 163. Media Development Authority Act, ch. 172 (2003) (Singapore), available at http:// 
agcvldb4.agc.gov.sg/non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?actno=REVED-172&doctitle=MEDIA 
%20DEVELOPMENT%20AUTHORITY%20OF%20SINGAPORE%20ACT%0A&date=lat
est&method=part. 
 164. Broadcasting Act, ch. 28 (2002) (Singapore), available at http://agcvldb4.agc.gov.sg/ 
non_version/cgi-bin/cgi_retrieve.pl?actno=REVED-28&doctitle=BROADCASTING%20ACT 
%0A&date=latest&method=part. 
 165. Broadcasting (Class Licence) Notification, Broadcasting Act, ch. 28, § 9 (1996) 
(Singapore), available at http://www.mda.gov.sg/wms.file/mobj/mobj.487.ClassLicence.pdf. 
 166. Internet Code of Practice (1997) (Singapore). 
 167. Id. § 4(1). 
 168. See Singapore Bans Gay Website, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Oct. 28, 2005, available 
at http://www.smh.com.au/news/breaking/singapore-bans-gay-website/2005/10/28/1130400335787 
.html (reporting that the Media Development Authority banned a gay Web site “after receiving 
complaints about the promotion of promiscuous homosexual behaviour and recruitment of 
underage boys for sex and nude photography . . . . [and] [i]nvestigations showed the two sites 
breached the Internet Code of Practice, which governs the content of websites in Singapore”). 
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filtering criteria in formal regulations may not be accountable to 
citizens. Overall, the more clearly authority for censorship is 
demarcated, the more legitimate decisions on restricting information 
will be. 
3. Opportunity to Challenge.  Censors make mistakes. In addition 
to challenging erroneous classifications, content owners may want to 
challenge decisions that correctly classify their Web sites by attacking 
the rationale underlying the state’s censorship. One aspect of 
accountability is whether a state provides citizens with the means to 
contest censorship. This aspect of accountability interacts with a 
state’s mode of governance—democratic institutions generally 
provide for redress, whether via legislatures or courts. This aspect 
also interacts with the level of specificity of the state’s filtering 
program; the more concrete the guidelines are, the easier it is to show 
whether a particular decision contravenes them. Allowing challenges 
to state censorship enhances legitimacy because it forces a state to 
justify its decisions, presses censors to align their decisions with the 
stated criteria for censorship, and allows content creators to argue for 
their material’s legality. 
China, for example, fares poorly on this front. The country 
implements its filtering policies via a congeries of statutes, agency 
regulations, and informal measures.169 Censorship mixes legal 
restrictions and tacit cooperation by Internet companies.170 It is 
 
 169. See, e.g., State Admin. of Radio, Film, and Television, Provisions on the Administration 
of Internet Video and Audio Programming Services, Dec. 20, 2007, available at 
http://www.chinasarft.gov.cn/articles/2007/12/29/20071229134709730745.html; Ministry of Info. 
Indus. & Gen. Admin. of Press and Publ’n, Interim Provisions on the Administration of Internet 
Publication, June 27, 2002, http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/displayModeTwo.asp?id=2393; 
Ministry of Info. Indus., Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services, 
CHINA TRADE SERVICES, Sept. 25, 2000, available at http://tradeinservices.mofcom.gov.cn/en/b/ 
2000-09-25/18565.shtml; Internet Soc’y of China, Public Pledge of Self-Regulation and 
Professional Ethics for China Internet Industry (July 19, 2002), http://www.isc.org.cn/20020417/ 
ca102762.htm (noting that the public pledge was drafted in order “to establish a self-regulating 
mechanism for China’s Internet Industry, improve the conduct of Internet Industry Participants 
and promote and ensure the sound development of the Internet Industry consistent with the 
law”). See generally Liu & Krovatin, supra note 109 (describing how local Chinese governments 
have recruited “Internet moles” to “tout the party line online and by doing so, to nip unrest in 
the bud”). 
 170. See generally Kristen Farrell, The Big Mamas Are Watching: China’s Censorship of the 
Internet and the Strain on the Freedom of Expression, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 577, 590 (2007) 
(“U.S.-based companies continue to capitulate on the new Chinese restrictions on speech. 
Google agreed to exclude from a list of links publications that the Chinese government finds 
objectionable. Microsoft sends an error message to Internet users in China who use its search 
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difficult to determine how to contest censorship, and who to hold 
responsible. Even citizens bold enough to challenge restrictions—
such as a dog owner who filed a lawsuit over the removal of his post 
criticizing Beijing’s animal size limits171—face legal hurdles (the court 
rejected his case) and informal pressures such as harassment from 
government agents. Chinese citizens—many of whom endorse a 
governmental role in regulating Internet content172—evidently view 
formal challenges as futile; only two such lawsuits have ever been 
filed.173 
It is not surprising that states with independent judicial systems 
are the most likely to allow citizens to challenge filtering decisions. 
Astrabet sued in Italian court to overturn government-mandated 
blocking of its site, and won.174 In the United States, the Center for 
Democracy & Technology successfully sued to overturn a 
Pennsylvania law mandating blocking of Internet child pornography 
that also caused filtering of over one million unrelated sites.175 
Although there is a strong connection between citizens’ ability to 
challenge censorship meaningfully and the overall form of 
governance in place in a country, it is possible for citizens to contest 
filtering decisions even in nondemocratic countries. For example, 
Saudi Arabia allows requests for sites to be unblocked.176 And efforts 
by civic actors in Tajikistan and Azerbaijan have led those 
governments to reverse filtering of political opposition sites.177 
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 175. Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 610–11, 662 (E.D. Pa 
2004). 
 176. See AL-ZOMAN, supra note 158, at 28. 
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Although they are less robust than Italian or American methods for 
challenging censorship, these examples show that there is a 
continuum of means to contest filtering and that a country’s 
governance is not a perfect proxy for this variable. Enabling citizens 
to contest censorship decisions is a key component of legitimacy. 
4. Countermajoritarian Constraints.  A final factor in measuring 
accountability is the existence of countermajoritarian constraints. 
Even under a democratic government, a state may discriminate 
against minority groups, whose limited numbers impede their ability 
to counteract majoritarian rule. Discrimination, unfortunately, may 
be popular. 
Censorship of minority-interest Internet content is common. For 
example, Vietnam blocks pages about the Montagnards, who are both 
a political minority (having aided the U.S. during the Vietnam War) 
and a religious one (being predominantly Christian).178 Oman blocks 
gay and lesbian sites.179 Pakistan blocks sites advocating independence 
for its Balochistan and Sindh provinces.180 
When a minority of citizens wants access to certain material and 
the majority wants to prevent it, filtering poses a difficult normative 
problem. When should the minority’s objections be upheld? 
Ultimately, this is a question of system design—that is, of determining 
what structures (if any) limit popular sovereignty. Here, censorship is 
one example of a larger puzzle in governance and legal philosophy. 
American legal scholars have long struggled to describe the proper 
constraints on majoritarian decisionmaking and to defend the 
rationale for imposing such limits in a representative democracy. 
Alexander Bickel described the “Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty,” 
noting that having an independent judiciary review (and, potentially, 
disallow) democratic decisions could cause legislatures to overly rely 
on courts to save them from illegitimate or unlawful actions.181 Bickel 
concluded, however, that judicial training and judges’ focus on a 
 
 178. OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 116, at 4. See generally Vietnam: Montagnards Face 
Religious, Political Persecution, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, June 13, 2006, http://hrw.org/en/news/ 
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mistreatment of Montagnard refugee and asylum seekers). 
 179. OPENNET INITIATIVE, OMAN 3 (2007), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_ 
Oman_2007.pdf. 
 180. OPENNET INITIATIVE, PAKISTAN 4 (2007), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ 
pakistan.pdf. 
 181. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–23 (1962). 
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case’s specific facts usefully enable reconsideration of controversial 
regulation.182 
Another perspective frames these limits as a second-order 
problem: they should prevent a majority from altering systemic 
structures to deprive minority voices of the ability to be heard and to 
participate in governance. John Hart Ely saw courts, and 
constitutional interpretation more broadly, as focused primarily upon 
ensuring procedural protections, while deferring normative 
judgments to government’s representative branches.183 Checks on 
popular sovereignty create perils, though—particularly when 
implemented through institutions with limited accountability. Thus, 
political philosopher Jeremy Waldron attacks countermajoritarian 
constraints as disenfranchising citizens and privileging the value 
preferences of judges who are subject only to limited political 
constraints.184 Whether, and to what degree, popular will should be 
limited—to protect shared values185 or to prevent discrimination 
against weaker minority groups186—is highly contested, and beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
Internet censorship may, however, make countermajoritarian 
constraints particularly important for two reasons. First, filtering is 
not always transparent: it can be difficult to detect what content is 
inaccessible or what sites are removed from search engine results.187 
(Contrast this with the ease of detecting censorship in physical media, 
as when copies of National Geographic in China had pages on 
disputed borders or ethnic minorities glued together.188) Filtering risks 
altering not government’s systemic structures, but the information 
citizens use to make decisions. Russian citizens may not know about 
political opposition, or its grounds for complaint, if contrary views are 
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Microsoft (Jan. 25, 2008), http://www.nartv.org/2008/01/25/degrading-transparency-comparing-
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purged from mass media.189 Thus, censorship subtly raises Ely’s 
concerns about skewing process. 
Second, censorship prevents access to material that might 
influence views regarding its necessity. It is easier to undercut 
political opponents or critics when material supporting their views is 
unavailable.190 Subjective preferences are not independent or static; 
they evolve in response to available information.191 As Oliver Wendell 
Holmes noted, today’s minority viewpoint may be tomorrow’s 
accepted wisdom.192 
Accountability may, therefore, require limiting censorship’s 
responsiveness to popular sentiment. This could include both 
regulatory inertia—dampening or delaying shifts with changes in 
social views—as well as countermajoritarian protections for minority 
expression. Filtering must be responsive to citizens’ preferences, but 
not too responsive. At a minimum, accountability analysis should 
include assessing how a country addresses minority concerns and the 
risks of majoritarian control. 
Accountability, the Framework’s final factor, complements the 
previous three by measuring how responsive censorship practices are 
to the people they are supposed to protect. With the Framework’s 
overview complete, the next question is how to translate the 
Framework into concrete tools for assessing censorship. 
III.  IMPLEMENTATION 
The Framework is only as useful as its implementation. The best 
way to apply it is for multiple entities, public and private, to construct 
quantitative metrics that measure how a censorship program fares on 
each criterion. As these metrics are used, they will inevitably 
compete, refining and improving their measurements. The metrics 
can, and should, guide corporate decisions, government regulation, 
and third-party assessments regarding Internet censorship. 
 
 189. See, e.g., Clifford J. Levy, It Isn’t Magic: Putin Opponents Vanish From TV, N.Y. 
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 191. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008) (discussing 
how the design of “choice environments” can lead to optimal decisions); Derek E. Bambauer, 
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77 COLO. L. REV. 649 (2006) (arguing that perceptual biases in information accumulation and 
processing undercut traditional decisionmaking models). 
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A. Developing the Metrics 
The Framework’s purpose is to enable rigorous assessments of 
the legitimacy of Internet censorship. Implicit in this goal is 
comparison: evaluating whether China’s Internet is more legitimate 
than Iran’s, or whether that blocking has become more legitimate 
over time. Comparison based upon general principles is difficult. It is 
challenging, for example, to establish why a particular state is 
transparent without a means of measuring that quality. Metrics 
provide that means. 
When all countries are evaluated under the same rules, it is 
possible to compare scores to determine relative position. 
Establishing a metric system with numeric criteria would be useful to 
rate a country on each of the Framework’s four factors. For example, 
a metric could evaluate openness by awarding points for disclosure, 
such as formal, written admissions of censorship; availability of 
rationales for filtering in official documents or Web sites; use of a 
block page when citizens attempt to access banned material; 
willingness of government officials to discuss filtering, and so forth. 
Freedom House uses an analogous metric system to assess the effects 
of a country’s political environment on press freedom, asking (among 
other questions) whether media regulatory bodies can operate freely 
and independently (scored from 0 to 2 points); whether the 
constitution or other basic laws protect freedoms of the press and 
expression, and whether those provisions are enforced (0 to 6 points); 
and whether there are penalties for libeling state officials, and the 
degree of enforcement (0 to 3 points).193 
In analyzing narrowness, a metric could check how effectively a 
country blocks material it seeks to censor (with 100 percent efficacy 
the goal); how many categories of material other than those officially 
targeted are blocked, and how heavily (using, for example, Open 
Directory Project’s classification system,194 or the OpenNet Initiative’s 
categories195 or global list196); and how precise the method used is (with 
less credit awarded for crude methods such as IP address blocking). 
Using metrics would consistently quantify filtering for the 
Framework’s four axes. Metrics have also been helpfully employed 
 
 193. FREEDOM HOUSE, SURVEY METHODOLOGY 3–4 (2008), available at http://www. 
freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop08/Methodology2008.pdf. 
 194. Open Directory Project Home Page, http://www.dmoz.org/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
 195. See Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 85, at 7. 
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for analyzing other contested issues, including corruption,197 press 
freedom,198 economic freedom,199 labor conditions,200 environmental 
friendliness,201 and ICT (information and communication technology) 
readiness.202 
Metrics serve at least four useful purposes. First, metrics 
translate abstract standards into concrete evaluations. Second, they 
can exert pressure upon laggards (at least, those who purport to 
espouse the relevant standards) to improve compliance. Third, they 
can help guide decisions—from where to locate a factory to whether 
to list a country as a human rights violator. Finally, metrics direct 
critical attention back to their standards. Implementation challenges 
can highlight criteria that are insufficiently precise or too difficult to 
measure accurately.203 
Designing a metric involves challenging, subjective choices in 
measurement. What considerations should be included? How should 
the components be weighed relative to one another? How should a 
metric account for internal inconsistencies, such as when ISPs filter to 
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varying degrees,204 or when government officials waver on admitting 
to censorship?205 The next normative choice involves comparing and 
weighing the different factors of the Framework. Should openness 
count more than narrowness? Finally, the metric must select the level 
at which countries can be compared. Can scores for each component 
be aggregated into a composite? Is it too difficult to comprehend 
factor-by-factor comparisons? Transparency International, for 
example, creates an overall measure of how corrupt a country is 
perceived to be.206 These are all hard decisions, and there are no 
obviously correct choices. As with filtering itself, there are likely 
multiple defensible answers. 
The best path is to generate multiple metrics, reflecting the range 
of defensible answers to these value-driven questions.207 Different 
entities could create and apply metrics. It would be optimal to have a 
mix of public actors (such as the U.S. Department of State or the 
Internet Governance Forum) and private entities (such as the Center 
for Democracy & Technology, Human Rights Watch, or the OpenNet 
Initiative) create measurement tools. Analysts will measure 
compliance with each factor differently—and will weigh the relative 
importance of each factor variously. Each metric should make clear 
both how it resolves these questions and why. This level of clarity 
would not only illuminate how censoring countries fare when the 
methodology for each factor changes, but it would also reveal the 
values that each rating entity prioritizes.208 
This is an unusual proposal: achieving greater insight and 
comparing countries more readily by using more than one metric to 
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rate them.209 There are several key benefits to having multiple, 
competing metrics. First, quantifying the Framework’s four principles 
involves subjective judgments. Analysts will differ, reasonably, on 
such choices. By making explicit their weighting, metrics can assess a 
country under different tests that could generate a consensus view, or 
expose key zones of disagreement. Second, competition presses 
creators to refine measurements. 
Demand from metrics users—nongovernmental organizations, 
state actors, and companies—will elucidate the benefits and 
shortcomings of each tool. As some metrics are used, and others are 
ignored, the set of reputable tools for future use will decrease. In 
addition, organizations that develop metrics can reassess their choices 
and how they implement them by examining the choices of other 
entities. The World Bank210 and Freedom House211 can address 
political accountability in ways from which other entities can learn, 
and OpenNet Initiative’s narrowness criteria will have refinements to 
offer other entities.212 Metrics should get better and fewer over time 
through competition. 
Finally, adopting an open, competitive methodology for 
measuring filtering is consistent with the Framework’s focus on 
process rather than substance. Metrics will not reflect a single view of 
how to measure factors, but will rely on interaction and competition 
to arrive at workable models. 
B. Alternatives 
There are other paths to produce metrics—most notably, a 
cooperative effort among stakeholders to produce a consensus tool, 
or a top-down approach. The proposed competitive process, however, 
appears more effective: cooperation has proven inadequate thus far, 
and no one entity has sufficient power to force adoption of its criteria. 
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1. Collaboration.  A metric produced through collaboration 
among affected parties and experts on Internet censorship is 
intuitively appealing. Such a metric would be more likely to be 
broadly accepted, and could eliminate the time necessary for 
competing models to coalesce and adapt.213 It could draw upon 
expertise to reflect best practices and avoid past errors. But 
collaboration suffers from two key shortcomings, namely, selection 
problems and risk of gridlock. Moreover, collaborative attempts at 
establishing a code of conduct for Internet companies have dragged 
on without producing readily measurable results. After years of 
frustration214 and press releases,215 these attempts have generated 
principles but no means to measure their implementation. 
The Global Network Initiative (GNI), a consortium216 of activist 
groups, civil society organizations, academics, investment funds, and 
three technology companies (Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!), finally 
released a set of principles intended to guide technology companies in 
dealing with governmental pressures on human rights issues.217 The 
Initiative sets forth principles similar to this Article’s Framework, 
such as governance, accountability, and transparency, but it confronts 
three critical limitations.218 First, only three companies have signed on 
to GNI, and although they are significant market players, it is not 
clear that they will induce other firms, such as Cisco or Skype, to join. 
Similarly, watchdogs such as Amnesty International have pointedly 
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declined to join the effort over concerns about its standards.219 
Second, reaching agreement on principles is straightforward, whereas 
implementing them and measuring that implementation is 
complicated. The Initiative sets up a methodology for 
implementation, but its use in practice remains uncertain.220 Finally, 
companies can avoid breaching the Initiative’s code by delegating 
control to local partners; firms need only use “best efforts” to ensure 
compliance with the principles.221 To date, the GNI is a cautionary tale 
about collaborative efforts rather than a success story. 
The GNI underscores the challenges of choosing participants in a 
collaborative effort. Selection reflects subjective values about which 
participants are and are not appropriate, relevant, and useful. For 
example, a consensus approach would include companies whose 
financial results might be affected by the metric they would help 
develop, such as Microsoft and Google.222 Companies with the most 
insight to contribute would be those with the greatest conflicts of 
interest: filtering software companies such as Secure Computing and 
Fortinet. Excluding these firms would detract from the effort to 
include all stakeholders, but including them would harm the metric’s 
credibility. 
A consensus effort could easily splinter. Those not selected 
might become disaffected, opting not to recognize the metric or even 
developing a competing one. It might be possible to launch a truly 
participatory, open source project to measure the Framework’s 
criteria, but Internet censorship is controversial, and open source 
projects often struggle to accommodate divergent views on contested 
issues.223 Consensus dissolves readily, as demonstrated by “forks” in 
open source projects.224 
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Even a collaborative effort that does not splinter may falter due 
to gridlock. Members may be unable to resolve differences of 
opinion. Some may delay due to strategic behavior—it may be 
beneficial to appear to work on evaluating Internet censorship 
without risking unfavorable analysis from the final product. The 
broader the range of participants, the more likely disagreement is to 
occur—technology companies, governments, and human rights 
monitors have divergent goals and normative approaches. Debates 
over the Global Network Initiative, which was styled as a 
collaborative approach, exemplify this problem.225 Thus, collaboration 
is unlikely to generate the necessary metrics. 
2. Top-Down.  A metric created through a top-down process 
could be developed more rapidly than one built through collaboration 
or competition and would enable standardized analysis. But a top-
down process would require a sufficiently powerful stakeholder to 
press for its adoption and use. For Internet filtering, there is no single 
entity able to impose its preferences on other stakeholders. This may 
be beneficial: any party sufficiently powerful to require use of its 
metric would be strongly tempted to codify its normative preferences 
on filtering into a mandatory standard. Measurements propagated by 
the U.S. government would likely include, even if only implicitly, 
American views about free expression. This would undermine the 
Framework’s agnosticism on substantive issues. 
Attempts to force a single metric would likely founder because 
dissenters could, and would, produce their own criteria. Thus, the two 
major alternatives for producing metrics—collaboration and a 
mandatory standard—are likely to dissolve into competition. It is 
preferable to begin with, and leverage, the inevitable jockeying 
among standards. 
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Finally, using competing alternatives to evaluate censorship fits 
well with the Internet’s ethos. Leaders or standards from TCP/IP226 to 
Google227 emerged from a welter of competitors. Even the core 
Internet protocols are framed as consensual standards,228 where usage 
is voluntary and replacement is commonplace.229 The Internet itself 
could be a valuable tool for creating, promulgating, and developing 
metrics.230 
An open, competitive process for producing metrics to measure 
filtering best enables development of useful tools to measure the 
Framework’s prongs quantitatively. 
C. Using the Metrics 
Metrics that measure the legitimacy of filtering can contribute to 
three contentious debates: corporate decisions on whether to sell 
censorship-enabling technology to a country; government 
deliberations on whether to regulate these choices through public law; 
and normative evaluations of filtering by third parties. 
1. Corporate Decisions.  Western corporations have stirred 
controversy by supplying technology that enables countries to filter 
the Internet, and by censoring the services they offer to these 
nations.231 California-based firm Fortinet sold firewall technology to 
Burma that lets its military dictatorship limit citizens’ access to online 
 
 226. See Laura Chappell, Migrating to IP, NETWORK WORLD FUSION, Oct. 18, 1999, 
http://www.networkworld.com/news/1999/1018feat.html (describing the “inevitable upgrade to 
TCP/IP” from Novell’s IPX/SPX, the previously dominant network protocol). 
 227. See Jefferson Graham, The Search Engine That Could, USA TODAY, Aug. 26, 2003, at 
1D, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2003-08-25-google_x.htm. 
 228. See S. BRADNER, THE INTERNET STANDARDS PROCESS – REVISION 3 (1996), 
ftp://ftp.rfc-editor.org/in-notes/bcp/bcp9.txt (noting the Internet relies on “voluntary adherence 
to open protocols and procedures”). 
 229. See, e.g., P. Mockapetris, Domain Names – Concepts and Facilities [RFC 1034] (Nov. 
1987), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1034.txt?number=1034 (replacing RFC 973). 
 230. See generally Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 
112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) (describing the emerging “phenomenon of large- and medium-scale 
collaborations among individuals that are organized without markets or managerial hierarchies” 
on the Internet); Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 1987–96 
(2006) (arguing that Internet reforms should be tailored to minimize their “impact on 
generativity”). 
 231. See generally David Bandurski, Pulling the Strings of China’s Internet, 171 FAR E. 
ECON. REV. 18 (2007) (describing how Internet censorship technology is enabling the Chinese 
government to use the Beijing Association of Online Media as its agent to monitor and filter 
Internet content). 
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material about human rights, political dissent, and ethnic minority 
groups.232 Cisco’s routers form a key component of China’s censorship 
system.233 Internal documents reveal not only that Cisco knows that 
China uses its products to censor the Internet but also that the 
company views this practice as a business opportunity.234 Secure 
Computing sells its Internet filtering software and content 
classification database to Saudi Arabia, Tunisia,235 and Sudan;236 
Websense provides its version to Yemen.237 Google, Yahoo!, and 
Microsoft operate search engines in China that remove results linking 
to blocked sites.238 Google’s localized French, German, and Canadian 
search engines similarly delist hate speech pages.239 Microsoft’s 
Chinese MSN Spaces blog site prevents users from posting sensitive 
keywords including “democracy” and “demonstration.”240 
Although they are profitable, these transactions generate 
criticism. In May 2008, U.S. Senator Richard Durbin compared 
Google’s justification for its Chinese search engine censorship to 
arguments for doing business with South Africa under apartheid.241 
The U.S. Congress has held numerous hearings on corporate 
 
 232. OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN BURMA IN 2005: A COUNTRY STUDY 
4–5, 18, 24 (2005), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Burma_Country_Study.pdf; see 
also Nart Villeneuve, Fortinet for Who? (Oct. 13, 2005), http://www.nartv.org/2005/10/13/ 
fortinet-for-who/. 
 233. See ETHAN GUTMANN, LOSING THE NEW CHINA 130–32, 158–60 (2004). 
 234. CISCO SYS., OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC SECURITY SECTOR 57–58 (2002) (on file with 
the Duke Law Journal) (describing the Chinese government’s goal to “[c]ombat ‘Falun Gong’ 
evil religion and other hostiles” and concomitant Cisco business opportunities in technical 
training, security, and operational maintenance); Glenn Kessler, Cisco File Raises Censorship 
Concerns, WASH. POST, May 20, 2008, at D1. 
 235. Ben Arnoldy, When US-Made “Censorware” Ends Up in Iron Fists, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Oct. 10, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1010/p01s01-ussc. 
html. 
 236. See generally OPENNET INITIATIVE, SUDAN (2009), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet. 
net/files/ONI_Sudan_2009.pdf (describing Internet filtering technology and its usage in Sudan). 
 237. Xeni Jardin, Exporting Censorship, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2006, at A23. 
 238. Villeneuve, supra note 100. 
 239. See Global Internet Freedom: Corporate Responsibility and the Rule of Law, supra note 
214, at 9 (statement of Nicole Wong, Deputy General Counsel, Google, Inc.), available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=3369; see also supra note 15. 
 240. Microsoft Censors Chinese Blogs, BBC NEWS, June 14, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/technology/4088702.stm. 
 241. Nate Anderson, Sen.: Iron Curtain Swapped for Virtual Curtain of Censorship, ARS 
TECHNICA, May 20, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080520-sen-iron-curtain-
swapped-for-virtual-curtain-of-censorship.html. 
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participation in Internet censorship,242 and members such as 
Representative Christopher Smith have introduced legislation that 
would ban these sales.243 Nongovernmental organizations such as 
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Reporters 
Without Borders244 have attacked sales to censoring countries. 
Owners of Web sites targeted for blocking have protested, and even 
offered guides to bypassing censorship.245 Although corporations 
concede the need for some constraints, they advocate for self-
regulation through voluntary codes of conduct, intergovernmental 
efforts to press for openness,246 and treating filtering as a trade 
barrier.247 
Operating in or trading with a country that censors online 
content can create conflicts: companies have a duty to shareholders to 
pursue profitable transactions.248 But their corporate values—and the 
values of the countries in which they are based—may counsel against 
such sales.249 For example, Microsoft opted not to locate its Chinese-
language Hotmail servers within China to avoid state demands for 
private user data,250 even though doing so would lessen the technical 
problems that occasionally plague Hotmail.251 Yahoo!, in contrast, 
 
 242. Anne Broache, Politicos Attack Tech Firms over China, CNET NEWS, Feb. 1, 2006, 
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1028_3-6033976.html. 
 243. See Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 244. See, e.g., Verena Dobnik, 13 Nations Denounced for Web Censorship, MSNBC.COM, 
Nov. 8, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15621193. 
 245. See, e.g., Jardin, supra note 237; Boing Boing, BoingBoing’s Guide to Defeating 
Censorware, http://www.boingboing.net/censorroute.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
 246. See, e.g., Foster Klug, U.S. Tech Companies Urge Washington to Confront China on 
Internet Censorship, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 4 2007, http://www.post-gazette.com/ 
pg/07035/758377-96.stm. 
 247. Id. (quoting Andrew McLaughlin, senior counsel for Google, testifying that Google 
wants censorship to be treated as a trade barrier); see also Tim Wu, The World Trade Law of 
Censorship and Internet Filtering, 7 CHI. J. INT’L LAW 263, 276–80 (2006) (analyzing whether 
internet filtering violates trade laws). 
 248. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919) (holding that 
corporations are organized for the purpose of shareholder profit, and that directors must pursue 
this goal); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 548–49 (2003). 
 249. See infra note 255 and accompanying text. 
 250. Rebecca MacKinnon, America’s Online Censors, NATION, Feb. 24, 2006, http:// 
www.thenation.com/doc/20060313/mackinnon (noting that Microsoft’s instant messaging and 
Hotmail services are “hosted on servers outside of China so it doesn’t have to hand over data”). 
 251. Sumner Lemon, Microsoft Restores Hotmail Service in China, INFOWORLD, May 22, 
2006, http://www.infoworld.com/article/06/05/22/78548_HNhotmailchina_1.html (discussing 
recent Hotmail problems in China). 
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placed its e-mail servers inside China, improving service but making it 
easier for security services to get the company to disclose user 
information. This information has been used to convict and imprison 
at least four dissidents.252 The tension is clear: offering Internet 
services from outside China reduces their performance and hence 
their attractiveness (some Chinese users switched from Hotmail to 
Google’s Gmail due to outages),253 but locating servers within the 
country increases the risk that a technology company may assist 
political repression. 
This challenge of deciding when to help censor becomes 
particularly acute when the filtering country represents an important 
market (China boasts the greatest number of Internet users of any 
nation)254 or when ethical behavior is particularly significant to a 
company (Google’s philosophy includes, “You can make money 
without doing evil.”)255 Many technology companies have a core 
business function of making information easier to access, and filtering 
runs counter to this basic goal. Though Yahoo! believes “information 
is power” and commits to “open access to information and 
communication on a global basis,”256 the company censors its Chinese 
search engine. Indeed, Yahoo! filters out more results than either 
Google or Microsoft.257 
How a company reconciles its choices with corporate values is up 
to each firm. Those decisions, however, will be challenged by 
 
 252. Rebecca MacKinnon et al., “Race to the Bottom”: Corporate Complicity in Chinese 
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China, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Aug. 2006, at 1, 31, available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/ 
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that Democratic Representative Tom Lantos of California criticized Yahoo! CEO Jerry Yang 
and General Counsel Michael J. Callahan during a House Foreign Affairs Committee meeting). 
 253. Sumner Lemon, Microsoft’s Hotmail Problems Persist in China, COMPUTERWORLD, 
May 18, 2006, http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9000605/Microsoft_s_Hotmail_problems 
_persist_in_China (discussing how one Chinese Hotmail user switched to Google’s Gmail 
service because of Hotmail’s technical problems). 
 254. Calum MacLeod, China Vaults Past USA in Internet Users, USA TODAY, Apr. 21, 2008, 
at 1A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/world/2008-04-20-Internetusers_N.htm. 
 255. Google, Corporate Information, Our Philosophy, http://www.google.com/corporate/ 
tenthings.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
 256. Press Release, Yahoo!, Yahoo!: Our Beliefs as a Global Internet Company (Feb. 13, 
2006), available at http://yhoo.client.shareholder.com/press/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=187 
401. 
 257. Villeneuve, supra note 100, at 3 (finding that Yahoo! blocked 20.8 percent of sites 
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BAMBAUER IN FINAL 11/6/2009  1:58:21 PM 
422 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:377 
observers ranging from activists to government officials. Employing a 
rigorous, defensible, public methodology for decisions will improve a 
company’s ability to justify its actions. Companies could use the 
Framework introduced in this Article to assess a country’s censorship, 
and incorporate this analysis into the company’s decision whether to 
sell filtering technology there. The Global Network Initiative 
expressly requires participating companies to make such assessments 
before entering new markets, and mandates that they review policies 
in existing ones.258 Using the Framework to guide decisions on where 
to do business would enable companies to make more responsible 
decisions and to use their analysis to justify choices if challenged. 
Technology firms appear to prefer self-regulation to independent 
review through efforts such as the Global Network Initiative. Even 
self-regulation, though, implies that corporations must assess 
internally whether to sell filtering technology. It also implies that 
some countries are not suitable customers. Self-regulation is 
suboptimal for two reasons. First, firms face pressure to resolve 
doubts in favor of consummating deals. Corporate governance—at 
least for American companies—centers on producing shareholder 
value.259 Companies will pursue sales when their internal standards do 
not clearly forbid them. Second, abstaining from questionable deals 
becomes difficult in a competitive environment. Another company 
may resolve doubts in favor of the sale, reaping benefits and placing 
virtuous competitors at a disadvantage.260 Firms also face 
displacement by domestic producers friendly to filtering in some 
markets, particularly China, which has moved to develop censorship 
technologies.261 Market pressures are likely to undercut self-
regulation. 
Companies inevitably face external pressures over their 
decisions. Freedom of expression groups have begun to use market 
pressures to push technology firms to consider filtering transactions 
 
 258. Global Network Initiative, supra note 220. 
 259. See supra note 248. 
 260. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age: 
Forward, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 38 (2002) (discussing News Corporation’s 
agreement to censor a controversial book and television channel in order to do business in 
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 261. See, e.g., Nart Villeneuve, 6/4 & Censorware (June 4, 2004), http://www.nartv.org/2004/ 
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more carefully. These efforts include adopting codes of conduct,262 
factoring human rights explicitly into decisions,263 and forswearing 
censorship altogether.264 Tactics combine financial incentives 
(including evaluation of filtering transactions in decisions on whether 
to invest265) with corporate governance measures (attempting to 
mandate consideration of human rights via committees empowered to 
review a firm’s policies266) and public relations efforts (seeking to 
embarrass directors and officers267). Investment firms have begun 
scrutinizing filtering practices by American ISPs, as well as firms 
operating abroad, using these methods.268 By using the Framework 
internally to assess proposed transactions, companies create 
defensible positions they can articulate to critics. 
Even if firms adopt the Framework’s metrics to guide corporate 
actions, there are still two ongoing risks: first, that companies will use 
them as a cover rather than a genuine component of decisions, and 
second, that firms will select (or create) metrics designed to legitimize 
most, if not all, potential clients. These concerns are real, but they can 
be mitigated. First, using the Framework commits companies to its 
merit. It forces firms to defend the metrics they use, having conceded 
the Framework’s applicability and the desirability of assessing their 
conduct. Some measurement constrains better than none. Second, 
outside watchdogs can check corporate conclusions both from an 
internal perspective (is the transaction justified under the company’s 
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own measurements?) and an external one (is that particular metric 
defensible?). Other companies’ decisions, and justifications, will serve 
as reference points. 
There is value in framing the supply of Internet-restricting 
technology by Western firms as a decision requiring analysis, 
disclosure, and justification. Currently, technology companies are 
opaque, or even misleading, about their relationships with filtering 
countries.269 Companies can use the Framework to improve, and 
defend, decisions about enabling censorship. 
2. Public Regulation.  The Framework can help governments 
decide whether, and how, to limit firms’ ability to sell censorware. So 
far, companies have generally resolved debates about supplying 
filtering technology in favor of transactions, generating calls for 
governmental regulation.270 Firms have variously supported and 
opposed such legal rules.271 Companies favor legislation as a 
negotiating tool with countries, but are reluctant to accede to 
regulation that may bar them from certain markets.272 
Nongovernmental organizations and experts line up on both sides of 
the debate; some see legislation as necessary due to failure of private 
ordering,273 and others view law as too blunt of a tool.274 Similarly, 
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FREEDOM ACT OF 2008 [H.R. 275] (2008), available at http://www.cdt.org/international/ 
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scholars have varying receptivity to legislation regarding Internet 
censorship, though most scholars see private corporate efforts as 
inadequate.275 Whether regulation via public law is desirable at all is 
contested, let alone the details of legislation. 
The Framework can aid regulators in three ways. First, 
governments can analyze other countries’ censorship to assess which 
nations engage in illegitimate filtering and then limit transactions in 
censorware with such countries.276 These countries could be targets of 
a ban on filtering technology sales. Second, the new approach can 
undercut objections to regulation. Lastly, the methodology can help 
regulators choose among seller-side, buyer-side, or mixed restrictions. 
Overall, the Framework best supports buyer-side restrictions and 
improves regulators’ ability to craft such limits. Rules crafted using 
the Framework would improve upon recent regulatory attempts. 
a. Regulation by Public Law.  Activists and legislators often 
propose regulation via public law to limit firms’ transactions in 
Internet censorship gear. There have been serious recent proposals 
for U.S. legislation to regulate how technology companies sell 
filtering technology, though none of the proposals has come close to 
enactment.277 Some firms support such limits on their behavior (albeit 
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weakly278), but many companies279 and commentators280 oppose them. 
The Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, for example, sought to 
develop minimum voluntary corporate standards on Internet 
freedom;281 identify Internet-restricting countries; prohibit U.S. 
companies from storing personally identifiable information there or 
from providing such information to those governments;282 require 
American-owned search engines to provide the State Department 
with terms and parameters used to alter search results;283 mandate that 
U.S. companies provide the State Department with filtered URLs;284 
and ban blocking of U.S. government or government-funded Internet 
content.285 
Objections made to the Global Online Freedom Act exemplify 
the challenges of public regulation in this space. The State 
Department argued that the bill would place American firms at a 
competitive disadvantage.286 The Department of Justice raised several 
concerns, including the concern that requiring ISPs to carry 
information could implicate American free speech protections. The 
Act’s definition of “Internet-restricting country” would likely include 
countries in Western Europe that ban hate speech. And the Act’s 
prohibition of the release of “personally identifiable information” 
could trap technology companies between the Act and foreign laws 
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requiring disclosure.287 These concerns, along with corporate 
opposition, effectively destroyed the Act’s chances to become law.288 
As the Global Online Freedom Act furor demonstrates and the next 
Section discusses, parochial issues, such as concerns about hobbling 
domestic firms in the international marketplace, and a canonical set 
of policy protests make public law regulation difficult. 
b. Answering Objections.  Public regulatory efforts to limit 
transactions with censoring countries, such as the Global Online 
Freedom Act, encounter objections along four fronts. First, 
companies argue that information technology is virtually always dual-
use: it can be employed for ends both fair and foul.289 SmartFilter 
blocks pornography, political sites, and sites that “offer[] different 
interpretations of significant historical facts” with equal ease.290 Thus, 
responsibility should be placed upon users rather than manufacturers. 
Second, even if companies censor directly, they argue that a limited 
platform for expression and information exchange is preferable to no 
platform.291 Third, firms point to their obligation to obey local laws: 
much as U.S. intellectual property law pushes Google to remove 
search results that may infringe copyright, China requires it to delist 
political opposition content.292 This hints at hypocrisy—why should 
the United States complain about censorship when America has its 
own content restrictions? Fourth, companies worry about 
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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/875630d4-cef9-11da-925d-0000779e2340.html; Andrew McLaughlin, 
Google in China, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG, Jan. 27, 2006, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/ 
2006/01/google-in-china.html. 
 292. See, e.g., Tom Krazit, Google’s Censorship Struggles Continue in China, CNET NEWS, 
June 16, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-17939_109-10265123-2.html; G. Jeffrey MacDonald, 
Congress’s Dilemma: When Yahoo in China’s Not Yahoo, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 14, 
2006, at 1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0214/p01s04-usfp.html. 
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displacement. If Cisco cannot sell filtering routers to China, then 
Huawei may displace them from one of the world’s most lucrative 
markets. Finally, laws on filtering require restricting access, but not 
providing information, making compliance easier—and perhaps less 
visible—for companies. 
The Framework can help evaluate arguments on dual-use and 
abiding by local law, and, by extension, the merits of claims that 
export regulation should be minimized or prevented.293 Regarding the 
legitimacy of dual-use technology, the Framework helps predict how 
a country will actually use the technology it procures. Firms generally 
evade the issue of how a country is likely to employ its new 
capabilities, which is precisely what the Framework helps uncover.294 
This predictive approach has helped regulate other dual-use 
technologies. For example, U.S. law prevents handgun sales to 
felons,295 but not to fearful homeowners. Companies are liable for 
products intended or designed to infringe copyrights,296 but not for 
those capable of “substantial noninfringing uses.”297 
The legitimacy of selling dual-use technology can be assessed by 
examining two factors. First, how is the filtering country likely to use 
the new gear? Cisco had to know that its Policenet system would be 
used by China not just for crime prevention, but for political 
control.298 Second, will the new technology expand the country’s 
capabilities, allowing it to broaden censorship? And is it inclined to 
 
 293. The other two contentions are beyond the methodology’s reach. Whether a country has 
a sufficiently developed domestic technology industry to sustain filtering without outside 
assistance is an empirical question. Whether a censored Internet shaped with Western 
technology is better than one without is a philosophical question, though recent data suggests 
Chinese Internet users have access to 20 percent more Web content on controversial topics due 
to the presence of Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! Villeneuve, supra note 100, at 17. 
 294. They also elide the question of initial design: when a manufacturer knows a product can 
be used for multiple purposes—some legitimate and some not—should that producer design it 
to minimize harmful uses? See Bambauer, supra note 289; Brief of Amici Curiae Emerging 
Technology Companies in Support of Respondents at 21–25, MGM Studios v. Grokster, 545 
U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480). 
 295. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) (2006). 
 296. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919 (“One who distributes a device with the object of promoting 
its use to infringe copyright . . . is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”); 
see also A&M Records v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming the award of a 
preliminary injunction against an online file-sharing technology company). 
 297. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
 298. See, e.g., GUTMANN, supra note 233, at 167–71; Rebecca MacKinnon, More on Cisco in 
China (June 30, 2005), http://rconversation.blogs.com/rconversation/2005/06/more_on_cisco_i. 
html. 
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do so? Ethiopia blocks some content critical of its government on 
political and human rights grounds, and it would clearly prefer to 
expand its filtering. But the state-owned ISP in Ethiopia lacks the 
sophistication to do so.299 Thus, selling a comprehensive filtering 
solution to Ethiopia would likely expand the country’s censorship, 
decreasing its legitimacy. The Framework’s analysis reveals what a 
country does with existing capabilities, and how legitimate those 
actions are. Thus, regulators can look to this track record to assess the 
propriety of selling new gear to that nation. In this way, the 
Framework can help evaluate the desirability of dual-use sales. 
Technology companies reiterate their need to comply with local 
laws and regulations where they operate.300 This position is a truism—
companies are expected to operate lawfully—and also a means of 
shifting attention from their actions to those of the censoring country. 
But this argument binds companies as much as it frees them; it 
requires that a firm’s actions comport with express laws or 
regulations, and not merely governmental preference. Companies, 
though, are highly responsive to informal government pressures on 
filtering. This is the case not only in China,301 but also in Britain,302 
Denmark,303 Sweden,304 and the United States.305 The Framework’s 
methodology can help outside analysts evaluate whether technology 
companies are simply following the rules or are currying favor by 
blocking sensitive content while hiding behind legalistic justifications. 
 
 299. See OPENNET INITIATIVE, ETHIOPIA 4 (2007), http://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/ 
files/ONI_Ethiopia_2007.pdf (describing Ethiopia’s hit or miss Internet censorship, in which 
some sports enthusiasts’ blogs are blocked while some opposition political sites remain 
accessible); Andrew Heavens, You Block Blogspot, I Block Boing Boing (Oct. 8, 2007), 
http://www.meskelsquare.com/archives/2007/10/ethiopia_blocks.html. 
 300. See, e.g., Global Internet Freedom: Corporate Responsibility and the Rule of Law, supra 
note 214 (statement of Michael Samway, Vice President & Deputy General Counsel, Yahoo! 
Inc.), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3369&wit_id=7182; 
Frank Davies, Holding Their Feet to the Fire: Google, Yahoo, Cisco Face Angry Senators on 
Rights of Users in Repressive Nations, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May 21, 2008, at 1C; Matt 
Marshall, Microsoft and Bokee Mired in Chinese Free-Speech Controversy, MERCURY NEWS, 
Jan. 4, 2006, http://www.siliconbeat.com/entries/2006/01/04/microsoft_and_bokee_mired_in_ 
chinese_freespeech_controversy.html; Google to Censor Itself in China, CNN.COM, Jan. 26, 
2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/BUSINESS/01/25/google.china/. 
 301. See, e.g., supra notes 271, 300. 
 302. See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text. 
 303. Filter Blocks Danes from Accessing Child Pornography, FIN. MIRROR, Nov. 28, 2005. 
 304. Press Release, Telenor, Telenor and Swedish National Criminal Investigation 
Department to Introduce Internet Child Porn Filter (May 17, 2005), available at http:// 
press.telenor.com/PR/200505/994781_5.html. 
 305. See supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text. 
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Companies also worry about being displaced by competitors. 
Unilateral limits on American firms could lead a country to substitute 
products or services from companies in nations with more lax 
regulation. Companies might also evade restrictions through clever 
restructuring. Yahoo! runs its operations in China through Alibaba, a 
Chinese corporation in which Yahoo! holds a 40 percent ownership 
stake.306 This enables Yahoo! to comply with China’s censorship 
demands while shifting responsibility to Alibaba (which cooperates 
enthusiastically).307 In addition, the Justice Department’s objection 
picks up on a potential inconsistency: it seeks to hamper Internet 
censorship abroad without examining relevant American practices.308 
Finally, American companies can comply with local laws 
mandating censorship because they are tilted toward filtering: 
blocking material is either required or optional, but there are no 
affirmative requirements to make information available. The 
Framework thus helps moderate the force of standard objections to 
regulating sales of censorship technology by assessing their merit 
more clearly. 
c. Selecting Targets.  Lastly, the Framework can help in making 
the choice among regulatory targets. Public law regulation of 
technology transactions can focus on sellers, buyers, or both. The 
Framework suggests that buyer-side restraints are likely best and 
most effective; moreover, the process-based approach makes 
implementing such restrictions more feasible. 
Constraining sellers’ behavior limits what one can send abroad—
for example, American companies must obtain permission before 
exporting strong encryption technologies.309 Limiting buyers prevents 
firms from conducting business in certain countries. American 
regulation of technology transactions employs both modes. The 
United States bans most trade to countries seen as sponsors of 
terrorism, such as Iran.310 U.S. companies cannot export goods or 
 
 306. Tom Zeller, Jr., Internet Firms Facing Questions About Censoring Online Searches in 
China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006, at C3. 
 307. See Stuart Biggs, Under Oath and Under Pressure, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 21, 
2006, at 1 (quoting Alibaba’s chief executive as saying “[w]e are very co-operative with the 
authorities”). 
 308. Frank Davies, Internet Freedom: Pressure Growing, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 
22, 2006, at A1 (quoting former CNN Beijing bureau chief Rebecca MacKinnon as calling the 
Act’s 2006 predecessor “hypocritical and arrogant” for this reason). 
 309. 15 C.F.R. § 742.15(b)(2) (2009). 
 310. See id. §§ 742.8, 746.7. 
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services to Cuba without a license from the Department of 
Commerce (which customarily denies applications),311 and foreign 
firms that do business there face penalties if a transaction involves 
property confiscated by Cuba’s government.312 There are also 
technology-specific embargoes on nations such as China.313 Even these 
limits have exceptions and uncertainties. Cisco sells police 
technologies to China’s state security forces that may run afoul of the 
post-Tiananmen Square statute limiting such exchanges—though 
Cisco argues that they do not.314 
Targeting sellers is much more challenging for regulators, for 
three reasons. First, regulating dual-use technology is hard, as 
previously discussed. Second, seller-side restrictions run counter to 
the goals of potential customers, who may pressure companies to 
evade the regulation or opt for non-U.S. providers. Finally, Internet 
censorship is dynamic, and public law regulation is relatively static. 
Even well-crafted laws may rapidly become irrelevant. Regulations 
designed for Web sites may struggle with new issues specific to user-
generated video (consider YouTube) or text messaging (think 
Twitter).315 
Regulating buyers is the better path, and the Framework can 
help by enabling evaluation of whether purchasers of censorship 
technology use it for legitimate purposes. The more legitimate the 
 
 311. Id. § 746.2; see also U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY, 
2004 REPORT ON FOREIGN POLICY-BASED EXPORT CONTROLS 40 (2005), available at 
http://www.bis.doc.gov/policiesandregulations/05forpolcontrols/04finalfpreport.pdf (stating that 
the Department “generally denies license applications for exports” of most items to Cuba, 
subject to certain “case-by-case” exceptions). 
 312. 22 U.S.C. § 6082 (2006); see also, e.g., Adam Liptak, A Wave of the Watch List, and 
Speech Disappears, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at A16 (describing the actions of the U.S. 
Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control to block access to the website of a British national 
organizing trips to Cuba for European tourists). 
 313. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990–1991, Pub. L. No. 101-
246 § 902(a)(4), 104 Stat. 15, 83 (1990) (suspending export licenses for crime control and 
detection equipment to China after the Tiananmen Square repression of 1989). 
 314. Global Internet Freedom: Corporate Responsibility and the Rule of Law, supra note 214, 
at 88 (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President Legal Servs., General Counsel and 
Secretary, Cisco Systems, Inc.), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/08-05-20Mark_ 
Chandler_Testimony.pdf; see also Bambauer, supra note 289. 
 315. See Ryan Singel, Seeking Tighter Censorship, Repressive States Target Web 2.0 Apps, 
WIRED, Mar. 4, 2008, http://blog.wired.com/business/2008/03/etech-what-happ.html; Ethan 
Zuckerman, The Cute Cat Theory Talk at ETech (Mar. 8, 2008), http://www.ethanzuckerman. 
com/blog/2008/03/08/the-cute-cat-theory-talk-at-etech/ (discussing censorship of Web 2.0 
technologies and describing a Tunisian video mash-up of Apple’s famous “1984” ad used to 
criticize President Ben Ali). 
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restrictions, the fewer concerns regulators should have about private 
firms supporting them. The Framework provides a yardstick to assess 
countries’ behavior, and hence whether corporations should transact 
business with them. Metrics-based analysis gives regulators more 
information to evaluate the problem (suspect sales, such as Fortinet’s 
to Burma, may be unusual) and, if necessary, to craft a response. 
Moreover, the Framework should help simplify any regulation that 
develops. It is easier to forbid selling filtering technology to 
Uzbekistan than to define what personally identifiable information 
can be stored there.316 
Buyer-targeted regulation offers ancillary benefits such as lower 
administrative and enforcement costs. For example, American 
companies cannot lawfully sell software to Iran.317 Secure Computing 
has stated that the SmartFilter software used by Iranian ISPs such as 
ParsOnline is unauthorized.318 
If the company had sold SmartFilter to ParsOnline, the violation 
would be clear and inexpensive to detect.319 In contrast, the legality of 
sales to China depends upon the products involved.320 Whether sales 
of Cisco’s Policenet to China contravene export restrictions depends 
partly on whether Cisco developed the system’s database and partly 
on whether Policenet is an “identification retrieval system.”321 This 
determination is not only unclear prospectively, it is a complex 
question that is costly to adjudicate. Regulation that is focused on the 
 
 316. Cf. Jeffrey Gedmin, Reporting Among Gangsters, WASH. POST, July 2, 2008, at A15 
(describing the Uzbek regime as authoritarian and prone to human rights abuses). 
 317. 31 C.F.R. § 560.204 (2008); see also Sun Microsystems, Embargoed Countries, http:// 
www.sun.com/sales/its/countries/Embargoed.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009) (listing Iran as an 
embargoed country). 
 318. OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN IRAN 2004–2005, at n.1 (2005), 
http://opennet.net/studies/iran#1. 
 319. See, e.g., OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 118, § 4.C.2.c (describing test used to 
determine if an ISP uses SmartFilter). 
 320. See Keith Bradsher, At Trade Show, China’s Police Shop for the West’s Latest, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2008, at C1. 
 321. 15 C.F.R. § 774, Supp. 1, ECCN no. 3A981 (2008) (identifying “automated fingerprint 
and identification retrieval systems” as controlled for crime control reasons under the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR)); see also MacKinnon, supra note 298 (alleging that Cisco 
“appear[s] to be directly flaunting” United States export restrictions by advertising its products 
for use by police in China and by building the structure of the Chinese police database); 15 
C.F.R. § 738 Supp. 1 (identifying the export to China of items classified as crime control 1 as 
subject to EAR license requirements); id. § 742.7(a)(1) (defining the export of technology 
classified as crime control as subject to regulation under the EAR); Bambauer, supra note 289 
(suggesting that Policenet may have been used to apprehend political prisoner Zheng Yichun). 
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legitimacy of the buyer’s censorship is not only easier to comply with 
but also cheaper to enforce. 
Gathering additional information could improve regulation by 
providing more data to analyze using the Framework’s metrics. 
Moreover, the Framework can suggest likely initial targets for 
mandatory data provision efforts. First, if regulators consider 
seriously regulating technology sales to filtering countries, they 
should gather data that would improve policymaking via mandatory, 
limited disclosure of corporate transactions. To assess whether public 
law is necessary, regulators need accurate information on the scope of 
the activity at issue. Corporations, though, are loath to provide 
specifics about sales of filtering technology.322 Determining this data 
from public filings or statements can be difficult or impossible.323 A 
confidential reporting system would improve regulatory decisions. 
Crafting the disclosure system would require care to avoid 
collecting irrelevant data (exposing companies to unnecessary cost) 
and to avoid missing relevant transactions (depriving regulators of 
useful information). Limiting the number of countries for mandatory 
reporting would be useful. Studying transactions with Mexico, which 
does not censor the Internet,324 would not help; capturing data about 
Vietnam would. To choose which countries to target, the system 
could select countries in which, according to the Framework, online 
restraints fall below a minimum threshold of legitimacy. 
Alternatively, the State Department could select the countries based 
on its annual Human Rights Reports,325 or the system could target 
states identified as repressing Internet content326 or with documented 
instances of Internet filtering.327 
 
 322. See, e.g., Arnoldy, supra note 235; Bambauer, supra note 289 (noting that Cisco does 
not disclose sales figures for China). 
 323. Secure Computing, for example, discloses only that 36 percent of 2007 revenues came 
from international sales, and that major foreign markets include China. Secure Computing 
Corp. Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 29 (Mar. 5, 2008). 
 324. Kathleen Connors et al., OpenNet Initiative, Latin America, http://opennet.net/ 
research/regions/la (last visited Oct. 25, 2009). 
 325. U.S. Dep’t of State, Human Rights, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2009). 
 326. Reporters Without Borders, List of the 13 Internet Enemies (Nov. 7, 2006) 
http://www.rsf.org/spip.php?page=article&id_article=19603 (maintaining a list of countries that 
“systematically violate online free expression”). 
 327. E.g., Zittrain & Palfrey, supra note 11, at 103; Opennet Initiative, Research, http:// 
opennet.net/research (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
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Some technology is irrelevant to Internet filtering—for example, 
Apple’s iPhone—and should be excluded from reporting. To address 
dual-use items, regulators should again focus on buyers. A simple and 
cheap, though admittedly imperfect, rule would mandate submitting 
data about sales to government agencies or service providers in 
targeted countries, or about transactions in which the reporting entity 
acts as an online service provider.328 To avoid evasion, providers could 
be required to obtain, and report, data from distributors and 
subsidiaries. 
A disclosure requirement—however limited—is likely to be 
opposed by technology companies. Regulation that focuses on buyers, 
however, combined with clear requirements from the Framework’s 
metrics, will make mandatory information provision less onerous. 
Past attempts to require disclosure of transactions with “terrorist-
sponsoring states”329 or potential environmental liabilities330 elicited 
substantial corporate opposition. There are, however, analogous 
programs designed to improve public regulation that suggest that this 
reporting system need not be onerous or risky for firms. For example, 
the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB) collects information 
about civil judgments, settlements, and criminal convictions against 
physicians and health care providers for malpractice.331 Insurers and 
other payers must report data to the NPDB.332 The general public 
cannot access these records, but regulators such as state licensing 
boards, professional societies, and federal agencies can.333 Regulators 
have used NPDB data to analyze such regulatory questions as the 
role of malpractice insurance premiums in rising health care costs,334 
 
 328. The regulation could incorporate the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s definition of 
“service provider.” See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1) (2006). 
 329. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, S.E.C. Rethinks Lists Linking Companies and Terrorist States, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2007, at C2. 
 330. See, e.g., William Baue, SEC Urged to Strengthen Rules Governing Corporate 
Disclosure of Environmental Risks, SOCIALFUNDS, Aug. 21, 2002, http://www.socialfunds.com/ 
news/article.cgi/911.html; Barnaby J. Feder, New Battles over Disclosure, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 
1990, at F10. 
 331. Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131–34 (2006); see also 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., National Practitioner Data Bank, http://www.npdb-
hipdb.hrsa.gov/npdb.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
 332. 42 U.S.C. § 11131. 
 333. Id. § 11137. 
 334. U.S. GAO, NO. GAO-03-836, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING 
PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE passim (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new. 
items/d03836.pdf. 
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and whether to limit damages in medical malpractice lawsuits.335 
Regulators gain access to data otherwise unavailable (settlement 
agreements are typically confidential), whereas participants remain 
shielded from public scrutiny. There are similar systems for reporting 
storage of toxic chemicals336 and “near miss” aviation safety 
incidents.337 Disclosure of transactions involving censorship 
technology would improve regulators’ ability to determine whether 
such sales are problematic and develop a response if necessary. 
Confidentiality would protect companies from reputational harm, 
thereby reducing their opposition and making the system more viable 
politically. 
* * * 
Regulating information technology transactions is difficult 
substantively and politically. The Framework can help regulators 
determine whether public law constraints on corporate transactions 
with censoring countries are necessary by analyzing how those 
customers employ the gear. Its methodology helps address objections 
based on the challenges of dual-use technology and obeying local law, 
and suggests that focusing on buyers is the optimal regulatory 
strategy. 
3. Third-Party Evaluation.  Filtering opens countries to an array 
of external criticism, including Slashdot discussions,338 State 
Department reports,339 press freedom analysis,340 and United Nations 
 
 335. See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Bush Enters Fray over Malpractice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
17, 2003, at A24 (citing NPDB data on average malpractice judgment awards). 
 336. 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (2008); 40 C.F.R. § 372.1 (2008); see also U.S. EPA, What Is the 
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program, http://www.epa.gov/tri/triprogram/whatis.htm (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2009). Toxics data is publicly available, though. See MARY GRAHAM, 
DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE 21–61 (2002). 
 337. NASA, ASRS—Aviation Safety Reporting System, http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/ 
summary.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). While incident reports to ASRS are voluntary, they 
are confidential, and policymakers employ them in crafting regulations. NASA, PUB. 60, ASRS: 
THE CASE FOR CONFIDENTIAL INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEMS 7 (2001), available at http:// 
asrs.arc.nasa.gov/docs/rs/60_Case_for_Confidential_Incident_Reporting.pdf. 
 338. See, e.g., Three ISPs Agree to Block Child Porn, SLASHDOT, June 10, 2008, available at 
http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/06/10/1819200. 
 339. See U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 325. 
 340. See, e.g., Reporters Without Borders, Dictatorships Get to Grips with Web 2.0 (Feb. 1, 
2007), http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=20844. 
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evaluations,341 among others. Internet censorship has received 
increased attention in recent years from evaluators such as the U.S. 
Department of State.342 There are many organizations that evaluate 
censorship, freedom of expression, press freedom, and related issues, 
including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Reporters 
Without Borders, International Freedom of Expression Exchange 
(IFEX), the U.S. State Department, and the U.N. Human Rights 
Council. Their assessments employ different methodologies—from 
legal probes of a country’s censorship343 to limited quantitative 
analysis344 to careful empirical testing.345 This methodological diversity 
can paint a more complete picture, but it makes comparison 
challenging. (Indeed, it can complicate assessing a single country 
because groups emphasize various factors: Venezuela does not filter, 
but its media restrictions346 and informal pressures on independent 
journalists347 limit Internet freedom of expression.)348 By using the 
process-oriented Framework methodology, third parties can take 
different normative positions on filtering and on how a country 
implements it, while increasing their assessments’ rigor and improving 
comparability. 
For example, Reporters Without Borders (RSF)349 classifies 
countries it regards as violating freedom of expression or the press 
online as either Internet Enemies or Under Surveillance.350 At the 
 
 341. See, e.g., UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE 
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW—TUNISIA 10, 12 (2008). 
 342. Bradley Graham, Violence Said to Slow Rights Effort in Iraq: Report Lauds Steps 
Toward Democracy, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2006, at A15 (quoting the Assistant Secretary for 
Human Rights on “growing attention to government censorship of the Internet”). 
 343. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE INTERNET IN 
CHINA 2–6 (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2001/08/01/freedom-expression-
and-internet-china (analyzing Chinese laws used to regulate Internet content). 
 344. See, e.g., Reporters Without Borders, Test of Filtering by Sohu and Sina Search 
Engines Following Upgrade (June 22, 2006), http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=18015. 
But see Villeneuve, supra note 100, at 21 (describing problems with the study’s methodology). 
 345. See, e.g., OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 116. 
 346. Human Rights Watch, Venezuela: TV Shutdown Harms Free Expression (May 21, 
2007), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/05/22/venezu15986.htm. 
 347. See, e.g., Simon Romero, Chavez Looks at His Critics in the Media and Sees the Enemy, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2007, at A6. 
 348. OPENNET INITIATIVE, VENEZUELA (2007), http://opennet.net/research/profiles/ 
venezuela. 
 349. Reporters Without Borders is better known as Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF); the 
organization is based in France. 
 350. See supra note 326. 
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extremes, it is difficult to quarrel with RSF’s sorting: North Korea’s 
Internet censorship trumps Jordan’s. But the organization’s 
methodology is less clear in the middle. RSF lists Egypt as an Internet 
Enemy, while classifying Tajikistan as Under Surveillance, a lesser 
designation. In contrast, OpenNet Initiative finds that Egypt does not 
filter, although bloggers and journalists have been imprisoned or 
harassed,351 but finds that Tajikistan filters political content.352 What 
makes Egypt’s online controls353 worse than Tajikistan’s,354 or vice-
versa? Assessments of Internet content control would improve with a 
consistent methodology that does not depend on what material is 
restricted and that reveals how RSF classifies countries. Employing 
the Framework here would improve analytical coherence. 
External evaluations of censorship face at least two challenges. 
First, a country may simply (and perhaps plausibly) claim that its 
filtering prevents social harms and is thereby justified.355 Second, the 
country may critique its critics, charging that they too engage in such 
practices and consequently are hypocritical.356 China recently rebutted 
American criticism of its human rights record by pointing to U.S. 
abuse of prisoners held at military bases in Guantanamo Bay and 
Iraq, as well as America’s surveillance of international 
communications.357 These responses achieve two ends: mitigating 
negative analysis by showing that questionable practices are 
widespread and reducing a critic’s credibility.358 In the filtering 
context, countries such as China frequently point to other nations’ 
 
 351. OPENNET INITIATIVE, EGYPT (2009), http://opennet.net/research/profiles/egypt. 
 352. OPENNET INITIATIVE, TAJIKISTAN (2007), http://opennet.net/research/profiles/ 
tajikistan. 
 353. Reporters Without Borders, Internet Enemies: Egypt (Mar. 12, 2009), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a38f987c.html. 
 354. Reporters Without Borders, Countries Under Surveillance—Tajikistan, http://arabia. 
reporters-sans-frontieres.org/article.php3?id_article=26127 (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
 355. For a discussion of Vietnamese claims regarding censorship, see supra note 87. 
 356. Cf. David J. Rothkopf, Values Conundrum: Will the U.S. and China Play by the Same 
Rules?, WASH. POST, July 11, 2005, at A15 (“The first step is recognizing everyone's 
hypocrisy.”). 
 357. See, e.g., Calum MacLeod, China: U.S. Criticism of Human Rights Record Is 
“Hypocrisy,” USA TODAY, Mar. 10, 2006, at 9A. 
 358. See, e.g., Frank Davies, U.S. Criticizes Abuses of Human Rights but It Has Used Many 
of the Same Tactics, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Mar. 1, 2005, at A5 (noting the U.S. State 
Department’s criticism of Pakistan, Egypt, and Syria for employing methods that the U.S. 
employed when interrogating captives). 
BAMBAUER IN FINAL 11/6/2009  1:58:21 PM 
438 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:377 
practices and portray their own efforts as similar.359 The Framework 
addresses both issues. It offers a consistent means to evaluate 
Internet censorship by all countries, distinguishing legitimate from 
illicit practices. In addition, its analysis reveals how well a government 
sets forth the harms it seeks to prevent and how well filtering targets 
them. 
If third-party analysts moved toward convergent criteria for 
measuring Internet censorship, it would be easier to compare—and 
critique—their evaluations. Freedom House and OpenNet Initiative 
both describe how they rate countries (Freedom House, for press 
freedom;360 ONI, for Internet filtering361). Thus, one can compare 
Freedom House’s negative evaluation of Oman with ONI’s relatively 
positive one.362 It is possible to reconstruct these conclusions based on 
each organization’s methodology, and to see how differences result 
from their distinct analytical focus. Oman suppresses little speech 
technologically (ONI), but much via legal, economic, and informal 
pressures (Freedom House). 
One criticism is that this proposal assumes away the problem: the 
difficulty lies in convincing organizations with different goals and 
values to adopt a similar methodology. This critique is partly correct: 
some evaluators might not be concerned with accountability, or might 
ground their analysis in substantive principles. There are two reasons 
for optimism, though. First, because it is process-focused, the 
Framework is compatible with disparate normative views on content 
restrictions. The Framework clarifies what restraints exist and how 
they are determined, without taking a content-based position. 
Second, analysts and commentators frequently advert to the 
Framework’s criteria.363 Openness, transparency, narrowness, and 
 
 359. See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, China Defends Internet Censorship, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 
14, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/14/business/net.php (quoting an official 
in the Information Office of the Chinese State Council that, in view of “the main international 
practices in this regard, you will find that China is basically in compliance with the international 
norm”). 
 360. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: METHODOLOGY (2007), 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=350&ana_page=339&year=2007. 
 361. Faris & Villeneuve, supra note 85, at 5–27. 
 362. Compare FREEDOM HOUSE, MAP OF PRESS FREEDOM: OMAN (2007), 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&country=7246&year=2007 (labeling 
Oman as “Not Free,” and ranking it 165 out of 195 countries), with OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra 
note 179 (noting that Oman has highly transparent and consistent filtering). 
 363. See, e.g., OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN ASIA 11 (2009), http:// 
opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_Asia_2009.pdf (evaluating the transparency of the Thai 
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accountability comprise the most commonly expressed principles 
used to analyze Internet censorship. This increases the likelihood that 
the Framework will be broadly acceptable. 
Finally, watchdogs should use the Framework for positive 
reinforcement as well as criticism. Organizations should use metrics 
to confer recognition—their “seal of approval”—on countries that 
score as legitimate as well as technology companies that engage in 
transactions only with these nations. This certification approach has 
many analogues. Web sites can obtain certification from the Better 
Business Bureau364 and TRUSTe365 for meeting data privacy 
requirements. Agricultural vendors can emblazon their coffee beans, 
flowers, and chocolate with a Fair Trade Certified logo if they 
purchase from growers who meet environmental and economic 
standards.366 Forest products, such as paper and wood, and the land 
management that produces them, can obtain certification from 
monitors accredited by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). These 
certifiers implement FSC’s criteria and standards but employ their 
own methodology for evaluating compliance.367 Certification systems 
provide positive incentives to engage in desired behaviors as well as 
negative incentives to avoid unfavorable ones. In effect, the rating 
entity lends its prestige to the companies it certifies. Similarly, 
 
legal process for implementing selective “geolocational filtering”); MacKinnon et al., supra note 
252, at 87 (urging the Chinese government to create a transparent process for the public to 
challenge censorship decisions); FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 360 (evaluating a country’s press 
freedoms based on the transparency of media ownership structures); Villeneuve, supra note 100 
(specifically noting that the Chinese government’s process for determining which material 
should be censored lacks both transparency and accountability); Zittrain & Palfrey, supra note 
11, at 115–16, 238 (noting that when local authorities require Microsoft to block content, 
Microsoft makes efforts to make this process transparent); Joint Declaration of the OSCE 
Representative on Freedom of the Media & Reporters Sans Frontières on Guaranteeing Media 
Freedom on the Internet (June 18, 2005), http://www.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/declaration_anglais.pdf 
(stressing that proceedings to determine the legality of Web site content should guarantee 
transparency and accountability). 
 364. Better Bus. Bureau, BBB Online Business Program, http://www.bbb.org/us/bbb-online-
business/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
 365. TRUSTe Homepage, http://www.truste.org/businesses/web_privacy_seal.php (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2009). But see Ben Edelman, Certifications and Site Trustworthiness (Sept. 25, 
2005), http://www.benedelman.org/news/092506-1.html (finding that 5.4 percent of TRUSTe’s 
certified Web sites are labeled untrustworthy by SiteAdvisor, versus 2.5 percent of Web sites 
listed overall). 
 366. See TransFair USA, Fair Trade Certification Overview, http://www.transfairusa.org/ 
content/certification/overview.php (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
 367. Forest Stewardship Council, What Is “Certification”?, http://www.fscus.org/faqs/what_ 
is_certification.php (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
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filtering certifications could be touted by countries in international 
fora (such as the Internet Governance Forum, or the U.N. Human 
Rights Council) or by companies when criticized. 
Seals of approval for filtering countries or companies assisting 
them will encounter at least two objections. First, some critics will 
disapprove of conferring any legitimacy upon online censorship. 
Although it is defensible, this position runs counter to strong support 
in most countries for restricting access to certain material. Moreover, 
public support means that governments are likely to censor, and the 
goal of certification is to press them to do so with maximal legitimacy. 
Second, there is a risk of strategic behavior. Countries and 
companies will probably either turn to or create friendly rating 
entities to award certification on easy terms. This may be particularly 
problematic during the early phase of evaluation, when third-party 
observers have not yet established sufficient recognition or credibility 
to counteract technological “greenwashing.”368 If observers look 
merely for a label, rather than its backer, this tactic can succeed.369 
This problem, however, can be mitigated. Organizations with credible 
reputations, such as Human Rights Watch or the Center for 
Democracy & Technology, should leverage existing recognition in the 
new zone of filtering certification. Greenwashing, or its censorship 
equivalent, is in itself a partial victory: it occurs when companies 
recognize that reputation in an area such as environmental practices 
motivates economic decisions by consumers.370 It signifies a shift in 
expectations about acceptable behavior. Similarly, even weak 
certifications commit companies to the principle that legitimacy in 
Internet censorship is important but uncertain, and their decisions to 
support it are properly subject to outside review. Public scrutiny can 
 
 368. See, e.g., TERRACHOICE, THE “SIX SINS OF GREENWASHING” 2–4 (2007), available at 
http://www.terrachoice.com/files/6_sins.pdf. See generally John M. Conley & Cynthia A. 
Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social 
Responsibility Movement, 31 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 18–20 (2005) (observing that watchdog 
organizations like Greenpeace must take care to “avoid complicity” in corporate efforts to 
conceal “environmental malfeasance”). 
 369. But see Eric Pfanner, Cooling Off on Dubious Eco-Friendly Claims, N.Y. TIMES, July 
18, 2008, at C3 (noting that consumers have become skeptical of misleading claims of 
environmental friendliness). 
 370. See generally Joshua A. Newberg, Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure, 
and the Market for Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L. REV. 253, 287–94 (2005) (arguing that firms 
“actively compete on the basis of ethical commitments” when their conduct is made 
transparent). 
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help convert these rhetorical commitments to action, even if it is 
limited. 
The Framework improves third-party analysis of Internet 
censorship by making it more consistent, rigorous, and readily 
comparable. Outside groups should use the Framework’s results to 
offer rewards that balance their critiques. 
* * * 
Metrics based on the Framework can help address three 
challenging problems: (1) how corporations decide whether to help a 
state censor the Internet; (2) whether a country should use public law 
to regulate those companies’ decisions; and (3) how third parties 
should evaluate filtering in a defensible, rigorous, reproducible, and 
comparable way. The Framework is not a panacea, but it is a useful 
tool for tackling each challenge. 
IV.  CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS 
There are three important challenges that complicate application 
of the Framework and metrics, namely, circumvention, 
interdependence, and China. Circumvention—often portrayed 
uncritically as an antidote to censorship—is more appropriately 
assessed under the Framework’s rubric as well. The term covers a 
panoply of technological methods that bypass online censorship.371 
With a tool such as Anonymizer, an Internet user can reach material 
that is otherwise blocked.372 Circumvention includes using proxy 
servers to fetch prohibited material on one’s behalf,373 routing 
requests through specialized unfiltered network nodes such as Tor,374 
and accessing blocked pages from a search engine’s cache.375 Falun 
Gong practitioners have developed sophisticated software tools to 
 
 371. See generally CITIZEN LAB, EVERYONE’S GUIDE TO BY-PASSING INTERNET 
CENSORSHIP (2007), available at http://citizenlab.org/CL-circGuide-online.pdf (describing 
several circumvention technologies such as Web tunneling software and anonymous 
communication systems, as well as explaining their use). 
 372. See Anonymizer, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.anonymizer.com/company/ 
about/anonymizer-faq.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
 373. See, e.g., Psiphon Homepage, http://psiphon.ca (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
 374. See, e.g., Tor: Anonymity Online, http://www.torproject.org (last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
 375. See, e.g., OpenNet Initiative, Google Search & Cache Filtering Behind China’s Great 
Firewall (Sep. 3, 2004), http://opennet.net/bulletins/006. 
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enable Chinese users to breach the country’s censorship, motivated 
partly by China’s heavy filtering of Falun Gong content.376 
Circumvention is typically praised as online civil disobedience—
technological resistance to unjustified limits on information.377 
Circumvention’s legitimacy, however, depends upon the filtering it 
subverts. Empowering Internet users to share information about 
democracy is inspiring; enabling users to trade child pornography is 
disturbing.378 Circumvention, like filtering, cuts both ways: it permits 
users to bypass all content restrictions. 
Like corporations offering technology to filter Internet content, 
entities distributing circumvention tools should evaluate a country’s 
censorship regime before helping citizens bypass it. If a country’s 
decision to block access to certain material is legitimate, then helping 
its users evade restrictions should be criticized, not celebrated. If the 
United States passes legislation to block children’s access to sites 
selling controlled substances without a prescription, helping children 
bypass that filtering would likely be illegitimate.379 (This assumes that 
the legislation is sufficiently transparent and narrow.) Thus, the 
Framework can serve another purpose: to guide circumvention 
designers and anticensorship activists as well as their opponents. 
The second challenge is that the Framework’s four criteria are 
interdependent. Accountability, for example, requires a level of free 
information exchange that filtering impedes. It is difficult to assess a 
country’s censorship from within—or to criticize it—if dissenting 
views are blocked. In Russia, allies of the government have moved to 
purchase existing media outlets and create new ones,380 enhancing 
 
 376. See, e.g., Global Internet Freedom: Corporate Responsibility and the Rule of Law, supra 
note 214, at 15–16 (statement of Shiyu Zhou, Ph.D.), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/ 
hearings/testimony.cfm?id=3369&wit_id=7187 (describing FreeGate and UltraSurf programs); 
OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 13. 
 377. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 129; Tom Zeller, Jr., How to Outwit the World’s Internet 
Censors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at C2. 
 378. See Robert Lemos, Tor Hack Proposed to Catch Criminals, SECURITYFOCUS, Mar. 8, 
2007, http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11447. 
 379. See, e.g., Keep Internet Neighborhoods Safe: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 10–14 (2007) (statement of Philip Heymann, Professor, Harvard 
University Law School), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=2755 
&wit_id=6468. The author of this Article acted as a technical advisor to the Internet Drugs 
Expert Working Group that developed the proposal outlined by Heymann. See Drug Strategies, 
Internet Drugs: Internet Expert Panel, http://www.drugstrategies.com/internetdrugs/iep.html#1 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2009). 
 380. Anton Troianovski & Peter Finn, Kremlin Seeks to Extend Its Reach to Cyberspace, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2007, at A1. 
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progovernment viewpoints, and prosecutors have begun to apply 
existing laws more stringently and frequently to bloggers and online 
critics.381 A filtering system—even an imperfect one—can sufficiently 
alter the information environment such that, although censorship 
appears popular, accountability is significantly diminished. 
Narrowness also affects the other factors. Overbroad filtering could 
indicate incompetence, but probably means that a country is less than 
forthright about what material it targets, reducing transparency and 
openness. Thus, the four factors are not always separable; shifts in 
one of the factors can (and perhaps should) alter the others. 
Finally, the critical test case for evaluating Internet filtering’s 
legitimacy is almost certainly China, which poses considerable 
difficulties. First, Chinese citizens are divided over their government’s 
proper role in shaping online content and the actions of American 
technology companies.382 Anecdotal evidence suggests that many 
users hate Yahoo! and (perhaps grudgingly) like Microsoft;383 
empirical evidence from market share suggests that both play a far 
smaller role in China’s online environment than domestic entities 
such as Baidu.384 Any conclusion about how technology firms should 
behave in China will be contested by Chinese users, among others. 
Second, companies—and perhaps even governments—have 
economic motivation to resolve doubts in favor of participating in 
China’s burgeoning market. Although statistics are not entirely clear, 
China appears to have the most Internet users and bloggers385 of any 
country—an attractive target for technology providers. Companies 
such as IBM have rushed to set up research labs there to tap its 
technological talent and to build relationships that can lead to future 
sales.386 Moreover, China’s censorship apparatus is itself a sales 
 
 381. See, e.g., Alex Rodriguez, Trial in Russia Sends Message to Bloggers, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 
31, 2008, at C8. 
 382. Fallows, supra note 172. 
 383. Thompson, supra note 110. 
 384. See Baidu Leads China Web Search Market in Q4, REUTERS, Jan. 25, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUSSHA11273420080125 (listing Baidu at 60.1 
percent market share, Google at 25.9 percent, and Yahoo! China at 9.6 percent). 
 385. Press Release, China Internet Network Info. Ctr., CNNIC Releases 2007 Survey 
Report on China Weblog Market (Dec. 27, 2007), available at http://www.cnnic.cn/html/Dir/ 
2007/12/27/4954.htm (claiming that China has nearly 73 million blogs and 47 million bloggers). 
 386. See IBM, China Research Laboratory, http://www.research.ibm.com/beijing (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2009). 
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opportunity, as Cisco and Nortel Networks have realized.387 
Technology companies may be willing to forgo sales to Burma or 
Sudan for ethical reasons, but China may be too lucrative to pass up. 
Applying the framework to China’s Internet censorship will likely 
produce a range of outcomes (though probably not wholehearted 
approval). Firms will seize on any seemingly favorable—or even 
neutral—assessments as justification for continued sales. 
Lastly, China is probably the country where withdrawal of 
Western technology firms would make the least difference to 
filtering’s success. China is developing domestic censorship 
technology for media from blogs to text messaging to cybercafé 
computers.388 Its citizens already prefer Chinese technology 
providers.389 Western firms will use this possibility to bolster their case 
for remaining engaged in China, even if its filtering program is 
deemed illegitimate. Leaving, they will argue, will at best make no 
difference to China’s Internet users, and at worst will deprive them of 
services offered by companies more resistant to state demands than 
locally based companies.390 
China poses difficult questions for the Framework and 
technology companies alike. Though most commentators have been 
critical of China’s filtering, conclusions should flow from analysis 
under the Framework.391 (Tellingly, companies such as Google and 
Microsoft do not defend China’s actions; instead, they claim that their 
presence will mitigate filtering’s ill effects.392) Even if firms decide to 
support China’s practices despite negative assessments, that does not 
destroy the methodology’s value. Indeed, the contrast between 
corporate choices and an objective, process-based evaluation would 
 
 387. See GREG WALTON, CHINA’S GOLDEN SHIELD: CORPORATIONS AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 8, 14 
(2001). 
 388. See OPENNET INITIATIVE, supra note 13; Villeneuve, supra note 261. 
 389. See, e.g., supra note 384 and accompanying text. 
 390. Cf. Villeneuve, supra note 100, at 2 (noting that Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo! have 
all pledged to increase transparency regarding their censorship decisions but that the industry’s 
overall transparency has declined). 
 391. See, e.g., Access to Information and Media Control in the People’s Republic of China, 
supra note 78; Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Malte Ziewetz, Jefferson Rebuffed: The United 
States and the Future of Internet Governance, 8 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 188, 204 (2007); 
Palfrey & Rogoyski, supra note 5, at 53–65. 
 392. See, e.g., Gates Defends China’s Internet Restrictions, TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 27, 2006, 
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/article721120.ece; McLaughlin, 
supra note 291. 
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provide critics with powerful ammunition. Finally, refusing to sell 
Western hardware, software, and services to China might diminish 
only slightly its censorship prowess, but inevitability does not erase 
agency. The question is whether it is appropriate for firms to assist 
China’s filtering, not whether they can prevent it. Substitution is not 
acceptable in other contexts: North Korea will torture political 
dissidents with or without Western assistance, but few firms would 
consider it legitimate to sell its government thumbscrews.393 
Circumvention, interdependence, and China complicate the 
application of the Framework, but do not diminish its utility. The 
Framework opens a window onto a complex problem, and it can 
clarify censorship’s challenges. 
CONCLUSION 
If Internet filtering were a stock, one would be well-advised to 
buy it: online censorship is on the march, in democratic states as well 
as in authoritarian ones. In the mid-1990s, a handful of countries used 
technology to censor the Internet. By 2006–2007, over three dozen 
tested by the OpenNet Initiative did so.394 Canada, Britain, France, 
and Finland already filter; Australia, Japan, and America (among 
others) are moving to do so. A country’s mode of governance is no 
longer an accurate proxy for the legitimacy of its Internet restrictions. 
Filtering is not limited to bad actors and repressive regimes. 
Cybersieves are becoming commonplace. 
This Article offers a new approach to evaluating Internet 
filtering’s legitimacy by focusing on the process by which censorship 
decisions are made. It proposes rating countries on the openness, 
transparency, narrowness, and accountability of their practices. This 
Framework seeks to engage a range of stakeholders—from 
governments to activists to corporations—in assessing filtering 
through quantitative metrics based on its four principles. The 
Framework also seeks to utilize these measurements in public and 
private decisionmaking. Consistent, rigorous analysis that is applied 
 
 393. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 311, at 9–19 (noting that the 
United States “has a policy of denial for any license application to export specially designed 
implements of torture and thumbscrews”); Press Release, U.N. Office in Belarus, Commission 
Adopts Measures on Situations in Cuba, Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea and Approves Special Rapporteurs for Belarus and Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (Apr. 15, 2004), available at http://un.by/en/hr/releases/21-04-04-4.html. 
 394. Zittrain & Palfrey, supra note 11, at 2. 
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to all censoring countries, and that illuminates comparisons among 
them, will improve the quality and perception of such decisions. 
Filtering is increasingly normal, but it should not be seen as natural. 
Instead, legal scholars should examine carefully, skeptically, and 
thoughtfully calls to restrict access to information online. 
